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In principle, a multiproduct firm can set separate prices for all possible bundled combinations of its
products (i.e., "mixed bundling"). However, this is impractical for firms with more than a few products,
because the number of prices increases exponentially with the number of products. In this study we
show that simple pricing strategies are often nearly optimal -- i.e., with surprisingly few prices a firm
can obtain 99% of the profit that would be earned by mixed bundling. Specifically, we show that bundle-size
pricing -- setting prices that depend only on the size of bundle purchased -- tends to be more profitable
than offering the individual products priced separately, and tends to closely approximate the profits
from mixed bundling. These findings are based on an array of numerical experiments covering a broad
range of demand and cost scenarios, as well as an empirical analysis of the pricing problem for an
8-product firm (a theater company).
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We study the pricing problem of a multiproduct ﬁrm facing consumers who may purchase more
than one (and possibly all) of the ﬁrm’s products. Examples include cable television companies,
professional sports teams, and online music stores. Such ﬁrms can choose from a wide variety of
alternative pricing schemes. They can simply sell their products at a uniform price, or they can
set diﬀerent prices for each of their products. There are also bundling possibilities: the products
could be oﬀered only as a complete bundle, or subsets of products could be oﬀered as bundles
and other products could be sold individually. The sheer number of available alternatives—for a
ﬁrm with K products, there are 2K −1 possible combinations of products that can be separately
priced—makes this a highly complex problem for ﬁrms. Even for a ﬁrm selling only 10 products,
there are over a thousand prices that could potentially be set.
In reality ﬁrms almost never implement complex pricing structures. Indeed, the reverse
seems more common: ﬁrms often employ remarkably few prices. Why is this? In this study we
show that simple pricing strategies are often nearly optimal. That is, in a broad class of models
it takes surprisingly few prices to obtain 99% of the proﬁt that would be earned by pricing every
possible bundle combination. Of course, it matters which prices the ﬁrm chooses to set. We
ﬁnd that bundle-size pricing (BSP)—a simple strategy that has not yet been explored in the
literature—tends to be more proﬁtable than oﬀering the individual products priced separately,
and tends to very closely approximate the proﬁts from mixed bundling.
BSP involves setting diﬀerent prices for diﬀerent sized bundles. For a ﬁrm with 3 goods,
BSP sets one price for the purchase of any single good, a second price for the purchase of any 2
goods, and a third price for purchasing all 3. The prior literature on bundling has ignored BSP,
instead focusing on a few other alternatives: mixed bundling (MB), in which the ﬁrm chooses
prices for every combination of goods; component pricing (CP), in which the ﬁrm sets diﬀerent
prices for each of its products; and pure bundling (PB), in which consumers’ only option is to
purchase all of the ﬁrm’s products at a single price.1
The prior research oﬀers two results of relevance for a ﬁrm with K products. First, MB
tends to be strictly more proﬁtable than CP.2 Second, it is possible that PB is more proﬁtable
than CP.3 Hence, the implication for a ﬁrm with 10 products, say, would be: the best thing to
do is set 1,023 prices under MB; and if that is not feasible (likely) then oﬀering all products only
1Component pricing is sometimes also referred to as “independent good pricing”.
2See McAfee, McMillan and Whinston (1989).
3See Stigler (1963) and Adams and Yellen (1976).
1as a single package may be more proﬁtable than oﬀering them individually (or perhaps not).
Our ﬁndings oﬀer a new suggestion: BSP requires only 10 prices and attains 99% of the proﬁt
from MB under most circumstances—even when demand is highly asymmetric across products.4
This is a signiﬁcant step forward in providing practical advice for multiproduct ﬁrms.
We show that BSP and MB both tend to drive consumers to purchase larger-sized bundles
than they would under CP. This has the eﬀect of reducing consumers’ heterogeneity in valuations
for the products, which was always the key insight of the bundling literature. Put diﬀerently,
the demand for each of the ﬁrm’s K products under BSP (where a product is deﬁned by bundle-
size) tends to be less heterogeneous than the demands for the K products under CP. With less
heterogeneity, the ﬁrm can extract more surplus.5 However, it may seem that CP would be
more proﬁtable when there is a high degree of demand asymmetry across products. In fact,
BSP is also able to extract surplus from individuals with high demand for one product and not
others—BSP does so by setting a high price for single-good bundles.
The heterogeneity-reduction eﬀect of bundling also implies that diﬀerent bundles of the same
size do not need to be priced very diﬀerently if the bundles are large. Hence, prices for large-
sized bundles under BSP tend to be very close to prices under MB. This is why BSP tends be a
good approximation to MB. One interpretation of our ﬁndings, then, is that many of the prices
a ﬁrm would set under MB are redundant.
Our analysis has two components. First, we perform a large number of numerical experiments
covering a broad range of demand and cost scenarios. In each experiment we compute the
optimal prices under CP, PB, BSP and MB, and the associated proﬁts. Numerical analysis is
necessary for this problem because the proﬁt maximization problem is analytically intractable
under all but the simplest assumptions about the distribution of consumers’ tastes.6 An obvious
limitation to this approach is that we cannot be certain our results will transcend the particular
parameter values we covered. For this reason, the second component of our analysis utilizes
an estimated model. This allows us to demonstrate that our ﬁndings apply to an empirically
relevant model.
The empirical analysis is based on a theater company that produces a season of 8 plays. It
4Since BSP nests PB, it is also the case that BSP is always at least as proﬁtable as PB and is often signiﬁcantly
more proﬁtable.
5In the extreme, if marginal costs are zero, as K → ∞ MB pushes all consumers toward purchasing the full
bundle (i.e. MB simply implements PB in this limit), and extracts the entire consumer surplus. See Bakos and
Brynjolﬀson (1999).
6We are not the ﬁrst to rely on numerical methods to analyze bundling problems. See also Schmalensee (1984)
and Fang and Norman (2006).
2is an interesting setting in which to compare the proﬁtability of diﬀerent pricing schemes. On
the one hand, the plays diﬀer in overall popularity, suggesting that component pricing may be
important for proﬁts. On the other hand, many consumers attend multiple plays, suggesting
that some form of bundling may also be proﬁtable. With 8 goods, MB would require the ﬁrm to
set 255 prices, which is clearly impractical. In considering simpler alternatives, how important
is it for the ﬁrm to set high prices for high demand plays? What about oﬀering discounts
to consumers that attend multiple plays? Or some combination of these? And how do these
alternatives compare to MB in terms of proﬁts and consumer surplus?
A key feature of the theater data is that we observe the set of plays chosen by each customer.
This allows us to identify the covariances in the joint distribution of consumers’ tastes, which
is an important determinant of proﬁtability under alternative bundling schemes. The estimated
demand system reveals strong positive correlations in tastes for most pairs of plays, which tends
to reduce the relative proﬁtability of bundling-type strategies compared to CP. Indeed, PB is
6% less proﬁtable than CP in this case. Nevertheless, we ﬁnd that BSP is 0.9% more proﬁtable
than CP, and BSP attains 98.5% of the MB proﬁts.7
While our focus is on bundling, approximating complex strategies using simpler alternatives
is also an important issue in the theory of contracts. Rogerson (2003) argues that in a standard
principal-agent model, most of the gains to the principal from oﬀering the optimal continu-
ous menu of contracts can be captured by simpler alternatives.8 See also McAfee (2002) and
Wilson (1993) for similar ﬁndings in the context of nonlinear pricing.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we summarize the relevant
prior literature. Section 3 describes the basic intuition underlying the various pricing strategies,
and presents the results from an extensive set of numerical experiments. The empirical example
is presented in Section 4. Section 5 concludes.
7If we set the estimated covariances in the demand system to zero, holding all other estimated parameters
ﬁxed, BSP is 20.5% more proﬁtable than CP.
8In the speciﬁc case of uniform types and quadratic eﬀort costs, he shows that exactly 75% of the gains from
oﬀering the optimal menu can be obtained using a simple two-item menu, consisting of a ﬁxed-price contract and
a cost-reimbursement contract.
32 Prior Theoretical Literature
The bundling literature explores the idea that a multiproduct monopolist can increase proﬁts by
selling goods in bundles, even when there are no demand-side complementarities or supply-side
economies of scope. If a ﬁrm sells 2 products, and consumers vary in their willingness-to-pay for
each product, then Stigler (1963) shows by example that selling these 2 products as a bundle
(PB) may yield higher proﬁt than if sold separately (CP). Adams and Yellen (1976) introduce
MB as an alternative to CP and PB, showing by example that MB can strictly dominate both
CP and PB. They also explain why higher values of marginal cost tend to favor CP over PB:
with bundling, individuals may consume products for which their willingness-to-pay is less than
the marginal cost to the ﬁrm.9
Two subsequent papers show that bundling (PB or MB) dominates CP in a wide variety
of circumstances. First, Schmalensee (1984) expands the analysis to demand systems where
consumers’ product valuations are drawn from a bivariate normal.10 Due to the limited com-
puter power at the time, Schmalensee does not compute optimal MB prices, instead focusing on
CP and PB. His main ﬁnding is that PB can be more proﬁtable than CP even when the cor-
relation of consumers’ valuations is non-negative.11 Second, McAfee, McMillan and Whinston
(1989) extend the prior results by showing that MB strictly dominates CP under rather general
circumstances.12
All the above papers analyze two-product monopoly problems. A few prior papers study
bundling with more than two goods. Bakos and Brynjolfsson (1999) focus on the proﬁtability
of PB as the number of goods (K) goes to inﬁnity. They show that if goods have zero marginal
cost, then as K goes to inﬁnity PB approximates perfect price discrimination.13 This ﬁnding is
particularly interesting in our context, since it provides an example of an incomplex alternative
to MB that closely approximates the proﬁtability of MB in a particular circumstance (i.e., large
K).
9In the language of Adams and Yellen (1976), these are violations of the exclusion condition.
10A concern with this approach is that the bivariate normal implies negative valuations for some consumers
which would impact the analysis in non-trivial ways, as noted by Salinger (1995). In all of the analysis in our
study we allow for free disposal.
11The numerical examples in Stigler (1963) and Adams and Yellen (1976) somehow suggest the importance of
negative correlation, as noted by Schmalensee (1984).
12McAfee, McMillan and Whinston (1989) also distinguish between ﬁrms that can monitor purchases or not.
With monitoring, the ﬁrm can charge a price for the bundle of 2 that is higher than the sum of component prices.
We limit our analysis to the no-monitoring case. See also Manelli and Vincent (2006).
13Bakos and Brynjolfsson (1999) also show that, under certain conditions, increasing the number of goods under
PB monotonically increases proﬁt. Geng, Stinchcombe and Whinston (2005) extend the analysis of Bakos and
Brynjolfsson to incorporate diminishing marginal utility.
4Armstrong (1999) provides a more general but similar result to Bakos and Brynjolfsson (1999).
He shows that a two-part tariﬀ, in which consumers are charged a ﬁxed fee and can then pur-
chase any products at marginal cost, achieves approximately the same proﬁt as perfect price
discrimination if the number of products approaches inﬁnity. In the special case of zero marginal
cost the two-part tariﬀ is equivalent to PB. The focus on settings with large numbers of products
may be quite relevant for some ﬁrms, such as booksellers or supermarkets. But clearly these
results are of questionable relevance to ﬁrms with 5 products, say.
Fang and Norman (2006) also examine the proﬁtability of PB with more than two goods. In
contrast to Armstrong (1999) and Bakos and Brynjolfsson (1999), they focus on ﬁnite K, and
they seek to determine under what circumstances PB is an attractive pricing strategy. They
conﬁrm that increasing marginal cost tends to favor CP over PB, as Adams and Yellen (1976)
had argued. They also show (by way of numerical experiments) that increasing the number of
goods may favor PB over UP.
For a ﬁrm selling a ﬁnite number of goods, the prior literature can be easily summarized:
MB is always more proﬁtable than CP, and in some cases PB may also be more proﬁtable than
CP. We contend these results are of limited practical value—MB rapidly becomes impractical
as the number of goods increases above a mere few, and even in the cases when PB is more
proﬁtable than CP it is conceivable there are other straightforward pricing schemes that will do
even better.
Hence, we focus on the question: do there exist pricing schemes that involve few enough
prices to be feasible, and that tend to yield proﬁts that are close to the MB level?
3 The Multiproduct Pricing Problem
In principle, multiproduct ﬁrms can choose from a wide variety of pricing schemes. For a ﬁrm
with K products, the optimal MB strategy requires setting (2K − 1) prices.14 PB and UP
require only one price to be set: the price for the bundle of all K products (in the PB case), or
the per-product price (in the UP case). In between these extremes are CP, by which we mean
setting K diﬀerent prices for the K diﬀerent products, and BSP, by which we mean setting K
prices that depend on the number of products purchased. Note that MB nests all the simpler
pricing strategies as special cases, so it will always be weakly more proﬁtable than any of these
14We subtract 1 because the ﬁrm does not set the price for the outside good.
5alternatives. Similarly, CP nests UP as a special case, and BSP nests both UP and PB as special
cases. CP and BSP are non-nested alternatives.
CP and BSP are of particular interest because the number of prices equals the number of
products, which is a reasonable benchmark for practical pricing strategies. However, there are
many other potential pricing strategies that also involve K prices that are nested subsets of
MB. The problem in these cases is that it is ex ante unclear which subset of K prices to choose.
There are also strategies (with more than K prices) that nest both CP and BSP.
It is natural to ask: what is the most proﬁtable pricing plan for a given number of prices?
In other words, it would be interesting to compute the upper-bound on proﬁt from any pricing
strategy that involves N prices, for each value of N from 1 to 2K −1, given a particular model of
demand and costs.15 Such an upper-bound is obviously increasing in N, but it would be useful
to know how rapidly the upper-bound approaches the MB level of proﬁts. This would provide
an indication of the value to the ﬁrm from additional complexity (as measured by the number
of prices).
There are a couple of challenges to computing such an upper-bound. First, there is a con-
ceptual issue: what does it mean to say a ﬁrm can choose any N prices? One needs to be precise
about how to determine the implied prices of bundles with unspeciﬁed prices.16 Second, in any
example with more than a few goods, there is a large number of possible pricing structures that
must be evaluated, which is a non-trivial computational challenge. For these reasons, a complete
answer to this question is beyond the scope of this study.
However, it should be noted that one of our main ﬁndings is that BSP usually attains around
99% of the proﬁt from MB. Hence, it is already clear from our analysis that the upper-bound on
proﬁts does indeed rapidly increase in the number of prices, N. There may exist other pricing
schemes involving K prices that are more proﬁtable than BSP in any particular example, but
typically such schemes can yield at most a 1% improvement.
In practice, multiproduct ﬁrms tend to use a broad range of diﬀerent pricing/bundling strate-
gies. Consider baseball teams, for example, which have 81 home games (products).17 For the
2006 season the Los Angeles Dodgers oﬀered several bundles of speciﬁc games, a discount for
15Malueg and Snyder (2006) show a related result: if a monopolist sells to N independent markets with diﬀerent
demands, and the cost function is superadditive (plus some other assumptions), then the ratio of CP proﬁt to UP
proﬁt is at most N.
16For example, CP involves K prices for each individual good and a rule for constructing the price of any bundle
with two or more goods.
17Under MB, with 81 products a ﬁrm would set 2.4 × 10
24 prices.
6choosing any 27 games, and equal prices for all individual games. In contrast, for 2006 the San
Francisco Giants did not oﬀer any bundles or quantity discounts, but the Giants did vary prices
by day of week and by opponent. Variation in pricing strategies is also evident in settings with
fewer products. Consider the Steppenwolf Theater in Chicago that produces a 5-play season.
In 2006-07 they oﬀered a discount for the 5-play bundle at a variety of prices that varied by
time-of-week, and equal prices for individual shows (also varying by time-of-week). In 2006-07
the San Francisco Opera had a 10-opera season and oﬀered 37 bundles (combinations of speciﬁc
operas and time-of-week), and equal prices for individual shows (also varying by time-of-week).
These examples highlight the dramatic diﬀerences in pricing strategies implemented by diﬀerent
ﬁrms in similar settings. We have been unable to ﬁnd an example of MB being used in practice
for 3 or more products.
3.1 Examples with Two Goods and Two Consumer Types
In order to clarify the basic intuition that underlies the various pricing schemes, in this section
we present select examples with two goods and two consumer types in which the optimal prices
under the various schemes are simple to determine. The examples illustrate how each of CP,
PB, and BSP may attain the highest proﬁts in diﬀerent settings. We adhere to the standard
assumptions of the bundling literature: (i) consumers purchase one or zero units of each prod-
uct; (ii) consumers’ valuations for a bundle equal the sum of their valuations for the bundle’s
component products (i.e. products are neither complements or substitutes); and (iii) there is no
resale.
The seminal papers on bundling pointed out that PB can be more proﬁtable than CP because
it may reduce heterogeneity in consumers’ willingness-to-pay. Consider the following example.
There are two consumers (A and B) and two products (1 and 2) with zero marginal costs. Each




In this case the optimal CP prices are 4 and 4, and the CP proﬁt is 8. With PB both consumers
value the bundle at 5, and so the PB price is 5, extracting the full surplus of 10. This is a textbook
example of why bundling can increase proﬁts even though there are no complementarities in
demand or costs.
7When is CP more proﬁtable than PB? Intuition suggests that if the optimal CP price would
be much higher for one product than the other, CP is likely to be better. But asymmetry of




Demand for good 1 is higher than for good 2, and CP accommodates this by charging a price
that is 4 times higher for good 1. The CP proﬁt is 10. But both consumers also equally value
the bundle at 5, allowing PB to also obtain a proﬁt of 10. CP does no better than PB, despite
the substantial demand asymmetry. Note also that the above valuations provide an example of
vertically diﬀerentiated products—both consumers agree that good 1 is preferred to good 2. It
is interesting that PB may be equally proﬁtable to CP in such a case.
For CP to signiﬁcantly outperform PB, the valuations must exhibit a kind of within-product
asymmetry. In particular, a large fraction of the extractable surplus must be concentrated on




In this case CP charges 5 and 2, and extracts 9. PB sets a price of 7, sells only to type B and
extracts 7. Intuitively, CP is able to charge a high price for product 1 in order to extract the
large amount of surplus attributable to type B, but this does not rule out selling good 2 to both
types. PB, on the other hand, by extracting as much surplus as possible from type B, ends up
abandoning type A altogether.
So far we have shown how PB may be more proﬁtable than CP, and how CP may be more
proﬁtable than PB. What about BSP? In all of the above examples BSP is equivalent to PB.
This is trivially true in the ﬁrst two examples, because PB extracts the full surplus.18 In the
last example, it is tempting to set BSP prices of 2 (for one good) and 7 (for two goods), but in
that case type B would choose only good 1 rather than the bundle of two, so BSP can do no
better than PB.19
18Note that PB can never yield strictly higher proﬁt than BSP because PB is a constrained version of BSP.
19Put diﬀerently: in order to induce B to buy the bundle, the BSP price for the bundle of one has to be
8Clearly BSP cannot do worse than PB. But under what circumstances will BSP be strictly




The optimal CP prices are 3 and 3 yielding a proﬁt of 9. The optimal PB price is 4, which yields
a proﬁt of 8. BSP charges 4 for the purchase of any single good, and 6 for the purchase of both.
Type A buys product 1, type B buys the bundle of both, and proﬁts are 10. Intuitively, the
reason BSP is more proﬁtable is that the consumer with the highest valuation for a bundle of
one is diﬀerent from the consumer with the highest valuation for a bundle of two. BSP is able
to extract more surplus by setting prices that separate the two consumers, whereas PB is forced
to pool the two types by lowering the price of the bundle of two.
Loosely speaking, we expect BSP to outperform PB when (i) willingness to pay for the
bundle of all K products is heterogeneous across consumers, and (ii) consumers (or consumer
types) who have the highest willingness to pay for a bundle of size m are not necessarily the
same as those with the highest willingness to pay for a bundle of size n > m. In Appendix A
we provide a formal condition that is suﬃcient for BSP to be strictly more proﬁtable than PB.
Note also, in this example both consumers weakly prefer good 1 to good 2 (vertically diﬀeren-
tiated products). This is analogous to a baseball team with one speciﬁc game that all consumers
value more than any other game. Economists sometimes cite the overwhelming popularity of
certain baseball games, such as games between traditional rivals like the New York Yankees
and the Boston Red Sox, as evidence that CP would be much more proﬁtable than UP. It is
interesting that in such a setting BSP may be even more proﬁtable than CP.
3.2 An Example with Two Goods and a Continuum of Consumer Types
The goal of any pricing strategy is to extract as much surplus as possible from consumers.
If consumers are heterogeneous, then a strategy that can separate consumers according to
willingness-to-pay will extract more surplus than a strategy that cannot. CP separates con-
sumers in a straightforward way: consumers with a high valuation for a given good can be
high—but doing this means that A doesn’t buy anything. The best BSP can do is pool the two types together
by charging the PB price.
9separated from consumers with a low valuation. In the two type example, this can result in one
type buying a single good and the other type buying both goods. The same pattern can arise
under BSP, but the mechanism is quite diﬀerent. For BSP to obtain separation of the two types,
the type with the highest valuation for a single-good bundle must diﬀer from the type with the
highest valuation for the two-good bundle. If not, then BSP is equivalent to PB and there is
pooling. Of course, this condition is inconsequential for whether there is separation under CP,
which illustrates that CP and BSP are very diﬀerent screening devices.
With a continuum of consumer types, the diﬀerence in screening becomes more complex.
Consider the following example. Assume there are two goods, both with zero marginal cost.
Consumers’ valuations for good 1 are uniformly distributed between zero and θ: v1 ∼ U[0,θ].
And consumers’ valuations for good 2 are uniformly distributed between zero and 1: v2 ∼ U[0,1].
Also assume that v1 and v2 are uncorrelated. The virtue of this model is that we can derive
analytic solutions for the optimal prices under CP, BSP and MB, as well as the associated proﬁts
(see Appendix B for details).20 If θ = 1.7 then the optimal CP prices are .85 and .5 for goods
1 and 2, respectively. Under BSP the optimal price for a single-good bundle is .9, and the price
for the bundle of both goods is 1.1. In this example BSP is 5.6% more proﬁtable than CP (even
though the optimal CP prices vary by 70% across the two goods).
The comparison between BSP and MB in this example is also instructive. Under MB,
the price for good 1 is 1.13, the price for good 2 is .67, and the price for the bundle is 1.18.
Unsurprisingly, the price for a single-good bundle under BSP (.9) lies between the two single-
good prices under MB. The price for the two-good bundle is quite close under BSP and MB
(1.1 and 1.18 respectively), in comparison to the diﬀerences in single-good prices. However, only
15% of the total proﬁt under MB comes from consumers who buy one good, with the remaining
85% coming from sales of the bundle. This pattern of BSP prices closely approximating the MB
prices for bundles but not for individual goods, and of bundles being more important to proﬁts,
also applies to the numerical experiments we analyze below. Put simply, BSP prices closely
approximate MB prices where it matters most—for large-sized bundles.
In Figure 1 we show how CP and BSP lead to diﬀerent partitions of consumers (for θ = 1.7).
CP is the most straightforward: consumers to the right of .85 purchase good 1, and consumers
above .5 purchase good 2 (with consumers in region A purchasing both). Under BSP consumers
in the two regions labelled C purchase one product (good 1 for the lower right C, and good 2
for the upper left C). And under BSP consumers in regions A, D and E choose the bundle of
20A limitation of this model is that BSP is weakly more proﬁtable than CP for all values of θ. Nevertheless,
the model is helpful for demonstrating the diﬀerences between CP and BSP for a given value of θ.
10both goods.
One interesting way to read Figure 1 is to ask which pricing scheme extracts more surplus
from which consumers. Consumers located in region A purchase both goods under CP and BSP.
Under CP, these consumers each pay 1.35 and under BSP they pay 1.1. Hence, the ﬁrm extracts
more surplus from consumers in region A by using CP rather than BSP. CP also extracts more
surplus from consumers in region B, since these consumers buy either good under CP and buy
nothing under BSP. BSP, on the other hand, extracts greater surplus from consumers in regions
C, D and E. Region E is particularly interesting because these consumers purchase nothing under
CP, and under BSP purchase the bundle of both goods. Consumers in region D also increase
the number of goods purchased (from a single good to two). In region C the number of goods
consumed remains at one, but BSP extracts more surplus because the price for a single good
(.9) is greater than both single prices under CP. To summarize these diﬀerences, in Figure 1 we
shade the regions in which BSP extracts more surplus from consumers than CP.
There are four main points to take from Figure 1. First, BSP is more focused on getting
consumers to purchase multiple goods than they would have under CP. Relative to CP, BSP
raises the price for single-good buyers, and lowers the price for multi-good buyers. It is proﬁtable
to do this in this example, but there is downside: (i) by increasing the price for a single-good
bundle, some consumers are excluded from purchasing anything who otherwise would have
purchased something (region B); and (ii) consumers that would have purchased both goods
under CP are given a discount under BSP with no change in their purchase choice (region A).
Second, from the ﬁgure it is apparent why negative correlation in consumers’ valuations
would increase the relative proﬁtability of BSP. Note the downward trend of the shaded regions
in which BSP extracts greater surplus than CP—negative correlation would tend to increase the
fraction of consumers in these regions.21 It is also apparent from the ﬁgure that BSP is capable
of extracting more surplus from individuals in the tails with high valuations for one product
and low valuations for the other (region C). Hence, it is wrong to presume that BSP is poor at
extracting surplus from consumers with a high valuation for only one product.
The third point concerns the consequences of diminishing marginal utility. The model that
underlies Figure 1 assumes the utility of the bundle equals the sum of the utilities of the two
goods. For some products, however, it may be important to incorporate diminishing marginal
21Introducing correlation to the example will change the optimal BSP prices, changing the details of the ﬁgure.
Note, however, the optimal CP prices do not depend on the correlation of consumer’s valuations—each good is
optimally priced independently of the other good, so correlation plays no role in the CP optimization problem.
Hence, the ﬁgure would change in some ways, but it would be qualitatively similar and this point would still hold.
11utility into the analysis—e.g., by lowering the utility of a bundle by some factor that increases
with the size of the bundle. In the extreme, if diminishing marginal utility is so strong that
individuals never consume more than one good, then CP is weakly more proﬁtable than BSP
(for any distribution of valuations).
Such reasoning suggests any degree of diminishing marginal utility should reduce the prof-
itability of BSP relative to CP, since the value of bundles is lowered. But this is wrong. Dimin-
ishing marginal utility also reduces the proﬁtability of CP, possibly by even more than it does
for BSP. This is because CP also beneﬁts from extracting surplus from individuals that pur-
chase both goods (region A), and CP actually extracts more surplus from this set of consumers
than BSP does. In other words, diminishing marginal utility reduces willingness-to-pay for the
bundle of both goods, which also reduces the amount of surplus that CP can extract. In the
counterfactuals based on our empirical analysis in Section 4, we indeed verify that incorporating
diminishing marginal utility can reduce the proﬁtability of CP by even more than it does BSP.
This is another appealing aspect of BSP from a ﬁrm’s point of view.
Fourth, this example gives an indication of the complexity of the BSP pricing problem. In
this simple case with two goods and independent, uniformly distributed taste distributions, the
regions of integration for determining demand for diﬀerent sized bundles are non-rectangular
and non-contiguous (i.e. region C). Adding more goods or incorporating non-zero correlation
will increase the complexity, and allowing for more realistic distributions of valuations (such as
normal) precludes analytic solutions. This is why numerical methods are essential for solving
the BSP optimization problem in more general settings.
3.3 Numerical Analysis with Continuous Types and More than Two Goods
Although the two-good examples described above are illustrative, our objective is to analyze
multiproduct pricing strategies in a more general context, and in particular to allow for more
than two products. As we have argued, when the number of products increases MB quickly
becomes highly complex. So it is important to understand which subset of prices (if any) can
capture a large fraction of the proﬁt that MB would obtain. The above examples illustrate how
any of CP, PB or BSP may be the most proﬁtable in any given circumstance.
The results in this section are based on a broad range of computational experiments in which
we solve for the optimal prices and proﬁts for 5 diﬀerent pricing strategies, which are detailed
in Table 1. In all experiments we assume a demand model in which consumer i’s utility from
12purchasing bundle j is equal to V 0
i Dj − pj, where Vi is a K × 1 vector of valuations for the
ﬁrm’s K products, Dj is a K × 1 vector of binary indicators for which of the K products are
included in bundle j, and pj is the price of bundle j.22 Each consumer’s problem is to choose the
oﬀered bundle that maximizes her utility. Consumers’ product valuations are heterogeneous:
Vi is drawn from a (multivariate) distribution F. Importantly, we allow for free disposal—if a
consumer purchases a bundle that includes a product for which she has a negative valuation we
assume zero utility from consuming that product.23
We vary the number of goods in the experiments from 2 to 5. Each experiment is performed
under four diﬀerent assumptions regarding costs: (i) all products have zero marginal cost; (ii) all
products have positive and equal marginal cost; (iii) all products have positive but diﬀering
marginal cost (we set marginal costs equal to half of each product’s mean valuation); and
(iv) marginal costs are zero but there is a binding capacity constraint.24
Table 2 describes 13 alternative assumptions on the distribution of consumers’ valuations
(F) that we consider in our experiments. Note that we include distributions with non-zero
covariances in product valuations across products. This is important since correlation in tastes
is a key determinant of the proﬁtability of bundling, as the prior literature has noted. Expo-
nential, logit, lognormal, and normal distributions are all commonly used in empirical studies
of demand. The uniform distribution is often convenient in theoretical studies of demand and
is also occasionally used in empirical work.
For each parametric distribution we perform experiments for a broad range of parameter
values. To help others reproduce our ﬁndings, rather than randomly draw parameter values,
we deﬁne a grid of uniformly spaced parameter combinations. The grid boundaries for each
parametric family are shown in Table 2. In each case the boundaries were chosen so that the
range of optimal prices is roughly similar across cases to help with comparability. It is also
important that our experiments include cases with a high degree of demand asymmetry, which
can favor CP. Hence, we choose grid boundaries that allow optimal CP prices to vary by up to
a factor of 10.25
22As in the two-type examples in the prior subsection, by assuming additive preferences we are ruling out
consumption complementarities as a motivation for bundling.
23Schmalensee (1984) does not allow free disposal. Either assumption may be correct depending on the partic-
ular products.
24For the experiments with capacity constraints we ﬁrst ﬁnd the optimal uniform price in the absence of any
capacity constraint, and then set the capacity constraint equal to .9 times the demand for the most popular
product under the optimal uniform price. This ensures that the capacity constraint will be binding for at least
one product under UP regardless of the particular parameters of the taste distribution.
25Speciﬁcally, the range of parameters for each distributional family is such that the optimal component prices
(assuming zero marginal cost) vary from about 0.2 to 2.0.
13It is conceivable a ﬁrm may consider bundling together products for which the optimal
component prices vary by much more than a factor than 10. We have chosen instead to focus on
settings where the component products are more similar. Baseball games are perhaps an ideal
example, because it is conceivable that the most popular game would have have an optimal
component price that is several times greater (though probably not more than 10 times greater)
than the least popular game. See also our empirical example in the next section. Nevertheless,
it must be noted that some of our results may not generalize to settings where demand diﬀers
more dramatically across products.
The granularity of each grid of parameter values varies with the number of products, so that
we analyze approximately 220 parameter combinations for each class of distribution regardless
of the number of products. We consider 13 parametric families, 4 marginal cost assumptions,
variation in the number of products from 2 to 5, and about 220 parameter combinations in each
case—leading us to compute 5 sets of prices and proﬁts in over 45,000 diﬀerent examples. Nu-
merical methods are used to ﬁnd the optimal prices in each case.26 We calculate the demands for
each bundle using a kernel-smoothed frequency simulator, as discussed in Hajivassiliou, McFad-
den, and Ruud (1996), using 10,000 simulated consumers and a logistic kernel with smoothing
parameter 0.02.
Before summarizing the outcomes of these experiments, it is important to acknowledge the
limitations inherent to this kind of computational analysis. Although we attempt to cover a
large space of parameter values, the results clearly depend on the speciﬁc parameters we choose
(i.e. the choice of grid). Further, there is no way for us to know whether we are under- or over-
sampling the relevant (i.e., empirically plausible) combinations of parameters. So, for example,
when we describe average outcomes, these should certainly not be interpreted as outcomes that
would be expected in an empirical sense—they should be interpreted narrowly as the average of
the experiments we performed.
3.4 Results from Numerical Analysis
Figure 2 provides a summary of the numerical experiments for 3 diﬀerent assumptions about
costs.27 The ﬁgure shows box-plots depicting various percentiles of the distribution of proﬁts
26Speciﬁcally, we use SNOPT, a sequential quadratic programming algorithm developed by Gill et al (2002) for
solving nonlinear constrained optimization problems. For BSP and MB, we also check to make sure the computed
optimal prices are robust to alternative start values.
27We exclude the experiments for positive and equal marginal costs because they add no further insight, but
we do include these results in the tables we discuss below.
14under each pricing strategy relative to BSP. To construct a given box-plot we pool experiments
across distributions of consumers’ valuations and for K = 2,...,5.28 Hence, while the ﬁgures
reveal the range of outcomes, they hide the diﬀerences across distributions and across K.29 In
Figure 2 each box-plot indicates the 1st, 25th, 50th, 75th and 99th percentiles of the distribution
of proﬁt for a given pricing strategy relative to BSP.30
As expected, Figure 2 shows that MB is always more proﬁtable than BSP (because MB nests
BSP), and BSP is always more proﬁtable than UP (because BSP nests UP). However, there are
two more substantive ﬁndings to be taken from Figure 2:
1. BSP tends to be more proﬁtable than CP. Based on the 46,344 experiments we performed
(across diﬀerent cost assumptions and across diﬀerent taste distributions), we ﬁnd that
BSP is more proﬁtable than CP 91% of the time. Furthermore, BSP obtains 13% higher
proﬁt than CP, on average.
2. BSP tends to obtain proﬁts that are within 1% of the proﬁts from MB. Speciﬁcally, the
proﬁt from BSP is within 1% of MB in 60% of the 46,344 experiments we performed. And
on average, we ﬁnd that BSP yields 98% of the MB proﬁts.
Figure 2 also shows that varying assumptions about costs has an impact on the relative
proﬁts of the diﬀerent pricing strategies, but the eﬀect is quite small. Under the assumption
of zero marginal costs, BSP is more proﬁtable than CP in 97% of the experiments, and BSP is
within 1% of the MB proﬁts in 75% of the experiments. In comparison, under the assumption of
positive and unequal marginal costs, BSP is more proﬁtable than CP in 87% of the experiments,
and BSP is within 1% of the MB proﬁts in 34% of the experiments (although even here BSP
attains 97% of the MB proﬁts, on average). This is to be expected since the prior literature has
explained that increases in marginal costs make “exclusion” (i.e., preventing consumers from
purchasing goods they value below marginal cost) relatively more important.
In the introduction we noted that prior research shows that PB can be more proﬁtable than
CP for ﬁnite K. We ﬁnd that PB attains higher proﬁt than CP in 61 percent of our numerical
experiments. We also ﬁnd that increasing the number of goods tends to favor PB over CP: for
K = 2,3,4,5, PB is more proﬁtable in 53, 61, 64, and 66 percent of the experiments, respectively.
Fang and Norman (2006) also ﬁnd this pattern in their numerical experiments.
28Note that we pool across parameter combinations for a given parametric family as well as pooling across
parametric families (in addition to pooling across K).
29Those diﬀerences are shown in Tables 3 to 6, discussed below, and in even more detail in Appendix C.
30We depict the 1st and 99th percentiles instead of the min and max of the distribution because occasionally
optimization error leads to misleading values for these extremes.
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the performance of each pricing strategy varies according to the parametric family for the joint
distribution of consumers valuations (under each cost scenario). We report the 1st, 50th and 99th
percentiles of the distribution of proﬁts of each pricing strategy relative to the proﬁt from BSP,
for each parametric family of consumers’valuations. Hence, we pool together the results from
experiments with diﬀering numbers of products (K = 2,...,5).31 In Appendix C we provide more
detailed summary statistics. To conserve space, we omit 5 of the parametric families described
in Table 2 from Tables 3 through 6, because they make no qualitative diﬀerence to any of the
ﬁndings.32 The detailed results for these distributions are, however, included in Appendix C.
The main point to take from Tables 3 through 6 is that the choice of parametric family may
not be innocuous in terms of the proﬁtability of diﬀerent pricing strategies. For instance, for
the logit distribution (which is one of the most commonly used in empirical research) BSP is
always more proﬁtable than CP regardless of the level of marginal costs.33 The same is true for
log-normal distributions.
The role of a given parametric family may also vary depending on which assumption about
costs is applied. For example, when marginal costs are all zero, BSP is always more proﬁtable
than CP if valuations are exponentially distributed. However, unequal marginal costs or capacity
constraints can change this.
Importantly, the normal distribution (including cases with independence, positive correla-
tions, negative correlations and unequal variances) is suﬃciently unrestrictive in the sense that
either CP or BSP may be the most proﬁtable under any assumption on costs. In the empirical
example we analyze below, we assume normally distributed tastes.
3.5 Discussion of Numerical Analysis
The numerical experiments demonstrate that BSP is sometimes more proﬁtable than CP, and
that CP is sometimes more proﬁtable than BSP (although the former is much more common in
our experiments). A key theme of this study is that BSP performs well even in the presence of
a high degree of demand asymmetry, as we explained in the two-good examples with analytic
31To be more precise, for each combination of parameters of the taste distribution we calculate the ratio of
proﬁts under pricing strategy X to proﬁts under BSP. The table reports various percentiles of this ratio across
parameter combinations and across K = 2,...,5. There are around 900 experiments in each distribution.
32We leave out: Lognormal(-), Lognormal(+), Normal(+/-), Normal(v-), and Normal(v+).
33Although the presence of capacity constraints can favor CP over BSP with logit demand.
16solutions. However, intuitively we still expect that increasing demand asymmetry favors CP
over BSP.
One simple measure of demand asymmetry is the ratio of the highest price to the lowest price
under CP. The greater this ratio, the more restrictive is BSP since it requires all single-good
purchases to be equally priced. Somewhat surprisingly, however, in our numerical experiments
this price ratio is essentially uncorrelated with the relative proﬁt of CP vs. BSP. Even if we look
at the top 10% of experiments in terms of demand asymmetry (as measured by the price ratio),
we ﬁnd that BSP is still more proﬁtable than CP in over 80% of these experiments. In other
words, a high degree of asymmetry does not imply that CP will be more proﬁtable than BSP.34
To better understand why BSP tends to obtain higher proﬁts than CP in our numerical
experiments, even when demand is highly asymmetric, in Table 7 we compare prices and market
shares under CP, BSP and MB. The table documents how close the CP prices and BSP prices
are to the MB prices, as well as the closeness of the market shares. For each possible bundle of a
given size we compute absolute price diﬀerences (as a percentage of the MB price), and average
these diﬀerences across experiments. For example, based on all of our experiments with K = 3,
including all cost scenarios, CP prices for individual component sales (bundle size equals one)
tend to diﬀer from the MB prices by 29.5%. In contrast, BSP prices in the same experiments
tend to diﬀer from MB prices by 65.7%. Hence, Table 7 reveals that CP prices for small-sized
bundles (for any given K) tend to be closer to the MB prices than BSP does. But for large-sized
bundles, and especially for the bundle of all K products, the BSP prices are typically very close
to the MB prices, unlike CP.
The fact that prices for large-sized bundles under BSP tend to be close to the MB prices
for the same bundles stems from two sources. Consider an example in which there are 5 goods
(K = 5), and consider the prices for the various bundles containing 4 of these 5 goods (there
are 5 such bundles). Under BSP these bundles are equally priced, while under MB there may
be 5 diﬀerent prices for these bundles. The results in Table 7 indicate that: (i) the average
price of these 5 bundles under MB is close to the uniform price under BSP; and (ii) there is
not much variation in prices across these 5 bundles under MB. The second of these features is
an interesting consequence of heterogeneity-reduction. That is to say, as bundle-size increases,
the demand for alternative bundles of the same size becomes similar. Hence, diﬀerent bundles
of the same size do not need to be priced very diﬀerently if the bundles are large. This is why
BSP prices tend to be an especially good approximation of MB prices for large-sized bundles.
34It is possible that some other measure of demand asymmetry is a better predictor of relative proﬁts. We
have explored several alternatives, but we have not found any single summary statistic (or collection of summary
statistics) based on demand asymmetry that serves as a good predictor of relative proﬁts.
17Consider also the market shares shown in Table 7. Under BSP and MB the tendency is for
the majority of consumers to purchase the bundle of all K products, while under CP there are
relatively few sales of the full bundle. For example, with K = 3, CP sells a single good to 38% of
consumers, while BSP and MB sell a single good to only 12% and 14%, respectively. Meanwhile,
BSP and MB sell the full bundle to 29% and 27% of consumers, respectively, and CP sells the full
bundle to only 8% of consumers. Hence, pricing under CP tends to be a better approximation
to MB for small-sized bundles than BSP, while BSP tends to be a better approximation to MB
than CP for the large-sized bundles. But the large-size bundles matter more—MB tends to sell
many more large-sized bundles than CP, and BSP does about as well as MB in this respect.
In summary, there are two reasons why BSP tends to perform so well compared to CP even
in the presence of a high degree of demand asymmetry. First, most of the proﬁt under BSP
derives from consumers that purchase multiple goods, and there is little beneﬁt from varying
prices across larger-sized bundles with equal number of products. Second, it needs to be a rather
particular form of demand asymmetry for BSP to be less proﬁtable than CP (see Section 3.1).
For example, suppose a ﬁrm sells 3 goods that are vertically diﬀerentiated and the optimal prices
under CP are 1,000, 10, and 1. This is an extremely high degree of demand asymmetry, yet
BSP can also perform well in this case, by setting a price for any one good of around 1,000, a
price for any two of around 1,010 and a price for all 3 of around 1,011.
Table 8 shows the consequences for social surplus. BSP and MB tend to yield signiﬁcantly
higher total output and higher proﬁts (as we have seen in the previous tables). The table also
shows that BSP and MB tend to also reduce the dead weight loss by signiﬁcant amounts, relative
to CP. Interestingly, the table also indicates that BSP and MB tend to result in lower consumer
surplus than CP. In our experiments, apparently BSP and MB are more like perfect price
discrimination. This comes from the heterogeneity-reduction eﬀect: there is less heterogeneity
in consumers’ valuations for bundles of multiple goods than there is for individual goods.
As noted in the beginning of this section, aside from BSP there are many other potential
pricing schemes that require the ﬁrm to set K prices for diﬀerent bundles of goods. It would be
interesting to compare the proﬁts from BSP with the distribution of proﬁts for all other K-price
schemes, for a given demand speciﬁcation. It is possible that another K-price strategy would be
more proﬁtable than BSP in any given demand speciﬁcation. Whether there exists a particular
K-price strategy that attains higher proﬁts than BSP across all possible speciﬁcations is ques-
tionable. We make no attempt to perform this analysis here because it imposes a signiﬁcant
computational burden. For a single demand speciﬁcation with 5 goods (K = 5) there are nearly
170,000 diﬀerent pricing schemes that involve 5 prices. Moreover, it would be important to im-
18plement this analysis for many diﬀerent demand speciﬁcations, numbers of prices, and numbers
of goods. We therefore leave this to future research.
Lastly, a potential concern is that BSP is such a close approximation to MB because prices
simply don’t matter very much in our experiments. To examine this possibility, we computed
MB proﬁts in cases where the ﬁrm is mistaken about the distribution of consumers’ valuations.
Suppose the true distribution of consumers’ valuations is joint normal with positive correla-
tions, but the ﬁrm sets MB prices incorrectly assuming negative correlations. In unreported
experiments we found this tends to yield around 15% lower proﬁt than if the ﬁrm had correctly
assumed positive correlations.35 This provides a degree of assurance that proﬁts are indeed
sensitive to prices in our experiments.
4 Estimation of Joint Distribution of Consumers’ Valuations
An obvious limitation of the numerical experiments in Section 3 is that we cannot be certain our
results will transcend the particular parameter values we covered. For this reason, the second
component of our analysis utilizes an estimated model, based on data from a theater company
that oﬀers an 8-play season. Given these estimates, we compute the proﬁtability of each pricing
strategy, allowing us to demonstrate that our ﬁndings apply to an empirically relevant model.
In this section we address the problem of how to estimate the joint distribution of consumers’
valuations from available data. It is important that such an approach allow for non-zero covari-
ances in tastes, because covariance is a major determinant of the relative proﬁts from diﬀerent
bundling-type schemes. This rules out one commonly made assumption in demand estimation:
that unobserved tastes have a logit distribution. Of course, we are not the ﬁrst to estimate
covariances in a demand system: recent examples include Bajari and Benkard (2005) and Hart-
mann and Viard (2007); see also Allenby and Rossi (1999) for a review of the earlier literature
on ﬂexible estimation of demand heterogeneity. It is also important that our approach allow for
consumers to purchase multiple products. This is somewhat non-standard in demand estimation
based on discrete choice models where it is commonly assumed that consumers choose at most
one product. However, at least a couple of prior papers have relaxed this assumption to allow
for multiple purchases in discrete choice settings, such as Dub´ e (2004) and Hendel (1999).
Several features make our particular empirical example an appealing context in which to
35These experiments were performed for K = 2,...,5 and with both zero and positive marginal costs. We also
considered a variety of other examples of mistaken beliefs. The results were qualitatively the same in all cases.
19study multiproduct pricing. First, the plays diﬀer in their overall popularity, making it plausible
that CP would be a sensible pricing strategy. Second, many consumers attend more than one
play, making it plausible that bundling strategies may also be proﬁtable. Third, individuals do
not consume multiple units of the same play. Fourth, the assumption of no demand or cost
interdependencies is reasonable. Fifth, we are conﬁdent there is no signiﬁcant resale activity—
these are plays produced by a small theater company, not rock concerts or professional sports.36
For all of these reasons, our empirical example is a remarkably clean setting, in which we can
abstract from the same complicating factors that theoretical analyses of bundling typically do.
A by-product of the analysis is that we measure the impact of each pricing strategy on
consumer welfare. This is interesting because bundling, like price discrimination more generally,
has ambiguous eﬀects on consumer welfare relative to uniform pricing.37 To the best of our
knowledge, there is one prior empirical analysis of bundling. Crawford (2006) tests the hypothesis
that consumers’ demand for a bundle of cable channels becomes less heterogeneous as more
channels are added to the bundle, which he ﬁnds to be the case. Based on a calibrated demand
model, Crawford argues that adding a top-15 cable channel to a bundle and re-optimizing prices
leads to 5.5% lower consumer surplus, and 6.0% higher proﬁt.38
4.1 Data Summary
The data for our empirical analysis come from TheatreWorks, a theater company based in Palo
Alto, California. We observe all ticket sales for TheatreWorks’ 2003–2004 season, which consisted
of 229 performances of 8 diﬀerent plays or musicals. Table 9 provides summary information for
each of the 8 plays. A total of 69,207 tickets were sold to the 8 plays.
Consumers could purchase tickets to individual plays at a uniform price, but most of the
tickets (80%) were purchased as part of a subscription. TheatreWorks oﬀered 3 subscription
packages: (i) the full 8-play season; (ii) any combination of 5 plays; or (iii) a pre-speciﬁed
bundle of 3 plays.39 These subscriptions were oﬀered at discounted prices, in the sense that
the per-play price was signiﬁcantly lower for subscriptions than for ordinary box oﬃce sales for
individual plays.
36See Leslie and Sorensen (2007) for an empirical analysis of ticket resale.
37See Leslie (2004) for a similar empirical analysis of the welfare eﬀects of price discrimination, which also
happens to be in the context of theater ticket pricing.
38Two studies in the marketing literature use survey response data to estimate demand and compare proﬁts
from UP, PB and MB: Venkatesh and Mahajan (1993) and Jedidi, Jagpal and Manchanda (2003).
39The pre-speciﬁed bundle consisted of the only 3 plays that were performed at TheatreWorks’ secondary venue,
a smaller theater in Palo Alto, CA.
20Table 10 summarizes the purchase options and their average prices.40 Subscribers, by deﬁni-
tion, purchase tickets to multiple plays. Importantly, non-subscribers may also purchase tickets
to multiple plays, and indeed we observe this in the data. However, among the non-subscribers,
we can only identify multiple-play purchasers if the tickets were mailed to them (in which case
we observe their name and address). This was the case for 45% of the tickets purchased by non-
subscribers. The rest were purchased anonymously at the box-oﬃce, and for these purchases we
have no way of knowing if the individual also purchased tickets to other plays. For the purpose
of Table 10, we assume the sample of non-subscribers for whom we observe mailing information
is a random subset of all non-subscribers, and extrapolate the same pattern of multi-play pur-
chases to the entire set of non-subscribers. This helps to provide a more complete description
of the sales patterns in the data. We do not rely on this assumption in estimation, as explained
below.
As shown in Table 10, there were 5,139 subscribers to the 8-play bundle, 2,794 subscribers
to a 5-play bundle, and 205 subscribers to the 3-play bundle. The popularity of the ﬂexible 5-
play subscription is a particularly important feature of the data. Observing which 5 plays these
subscribers selected allows us to identify the covariance of tastes across plays—e.g., if we observe
that two plays tend to be included together disproportionately often in the 5-play combination,
we know that tastes for those two plays are more positively correlated. Conversely, if another
pair of plays is rarely included in the same bundle, we can infer that tastes for those two plays
are less positively correlated. This information is crucial to our analysis. If we had only data
on aggregate sales for each play we would be unable to identify the covariance structure of
demand. Berry, Levinsohn and Pakes (2004) utilize a similar identiﬁcation strategy in their
study of demand for cars, in which they exploit second-choice data to help identify cross-price
elasticities.
Table 11 summarizes the correlations within the sample of pick-5 purchases: it reports the
diﬀerence between the empirical correlations of the choices and the correlations that would be
expected if tastes were independent.41 The patterns make intuitive sense. For example, tastes
for Bat Boy, described in the brochure as a “wacky new musical,” are positively correlated with
tastes for Memphis, described as a “rafter-rattling musical comedy.” Conversely, tastes for Bat
Boy are negatively correlated with All My Sons, a classic Arthur Miller drama billed as an
“intense, compelling tale of love, greed, and personal responsibility.”
40In fact prices also vary by time of week (but not by play). We therefore report simple (unweighted) averages
of these prices. Note also, prices do not vary by seat quality. This is because the venues are small enough that
the variation in seat quality is fairly minor.
41Since each consumer selected 5 plays from 8, the pairwise correlations will be nonzero even if tastes are
independent. The expected correlation if plays are chosen independently is -1/7.
214.2 Empirical Model
The empirical speciﬁcation is based on an underlying model of individual consumer utility max-
imization, and follows the approach in the theoretical literature on bundling. The ﬁrm oﬀers
j = 1,...,J −1 bundles containing combinations of the k = 1,...,K products. There is also a Jth
option for consumers which is the outside alternative. We assume the net utility to consumer i






i Dj − αpj : j = {1,...,J}
0 : j = J
where Vi is a K × 1 vector of valuations for the individual plays, Dj is a K × 1 vector of
indicators for whether each play is included in bundle j, pj is the price of the bundle, and α > 0
measures the sensitivity to price. As always in the bundling literature, we assume there are no
demand-side complementarities from consuming particular plays together.
We allow for two classes of consumers: theater-lovers and regular consumers. In fact the
data support this description, as we explain below in the subsection on identiﬁcation. Formally,
we assume that consumers’ product valuations are distributed according to a K-dimensional
bimodal normal distribution, with censoring at zero to incorporate free disposal:





¯ θ : probability λ
0 : probability (1 − λ); and
i ∼ N(µ,Σ).
In this notation, µ is a K ×1 vector of means, Σ is a K ×K variance-covariance matrix, and ¯ θ is
a scalar additive component (equal for all plays). A fraction λ of consumers are theater-lovers,
for whom the marginal distribution of play valuations is shifted upward by some amount ¯ θ that
is constant across plays. A fraction (1−λ) are regular consumers with no particular preference
for seeing plays in general. In the next subsection we discuss how the data identify λ and ¯ θ.
The conditional means of V are not well-identiﬁed separately from the variances. Intuitively,
increasing the variance in valuations for a particular play and increasing the mean of the val-
uations for that play both lead to higher demand for the play. To address this we impose the
restriction that all mean terms equal zero (µ(k) = 0, ∀k), but leave the variance-covariance
matrix unconstrained.42 In fact we also estimated the model based on the restriction that all
42We also normalize the variance of valuations for play (1) to equal 1: Σ(1,1) = 1.
22variances equal one and the mean terms are unconstrained, but we found that version to be too
restrictive in the following sense: BSP is always more proﬁtable than CP, even in counterfactuals
where we dramatically increase the asymmetry across products by making the mean valuations
for each play very diﬀerent across plays. In contrast, in the speciﬁcation with free variances it
is possible that either CP or BSP may be more proﬁtable, depending on the particular values
of the variance terms. We viewed this as a desirable attribute for the model. Note that our
approach has the implication that a high quality play will have a higher variance in consumers’
valuations—i.e. our model captures quality via the variance terms rather than the means, which
is unconventional in the literature.
The season of 8 plays implies 255 possible product combinations. This includes each individ-
ual play, the preset bundle of 3, the full bundle of all 8, 56 possible combinations of 5 plays (for
pick-5 subscribers), and any other combination by consumers adding individual plays. In fact we
observe zero sales of bundles of six or seven plays. We therefore exclude these combinations from
the consumer’s choice set. Hence, we model the demand for 219 diﬀerent bundles, plus an outside
alternative, giving a total of 220 possible choices (i.e. J = 220). Note that capacity constraints
are infrequently binding in the data—only 27 of the 229 performances were sold out—leading
us to abstract from their impact in the estimation. In the subsequent counterfactual analyses
we check whether capacity constraints are binding.
Recall that for non-subscription purchases we cannot always determine whether the individ-
ual purchased multiple plays, because roughly half of these purchases were made anonymously
at the box oﬃce. This means that we do not observe market shares for combinations involv-
ing fewer than 5 plays purchased by the same individual. For this reason, we estimate the
model’s parameters by the method of simulated moments (see McFadden (1989) and Pakes and
Pollard (1989)). Using a method of moments approach allows us to treat this data problem
conservatively, without throwing away information that we do have from non-subscription pur-
chases. Speciﬁcally, we only use moment conditions that are based on market shares we directly
observe:
• Share of consumers who chose all 8 plays (1 moment condition)
• Shares of consumers choosing speciﬁc combinations of 5 plays (56 moment conditions)
• Share of consumers choosing the pre-set bundle of 3 plays (1 moment condition)
• Overall market shares of each play: i.e., what fraction of consumers purchased a given play
as part of any bundle (8 moment conditions).
23The last set of moment conditions utilizes information from non-subscribers without imposing
any assumptions about their pattern of multi-play purchases.43
To ensure that the estimated demand model yields predicted prices that are close to the
observed prices, we impose a supply-side pricing constraint in the estimation.44 For any given
set of parameters of the above demand system, we can compute the proﬁt-maximizing prices
under the actual TheatreWorks pricing structure: a price for any individual play, a price for the
preset bundle of 3, a price for choosing any 5, and a price for all 8 plays.45 Solving for these
prices for each iteration of conjectured parameters is computationally burdensome, however, so
we simplify the constraint in the following way. Rather than jointly optimize all four prices
in the TheatreWorks pricing scheme, we jointly optimize the price of any individual play and
the price of all 8 plays. We then “ﬁll in” the 3-play and 5-play prices by assuming their ratios
to the single-play price are equal to the ratios actually set by TheatreWorks. This reduces the
number of prices we must optimize from 4 to 2, which we found to be essential for computational
feasibility. Hence, the speciﬁc constraint we impose is that the predicted single-play price, and
the predicted price for the subscription to all 8 plays, are equal to the observed prices.46
To compute the share of the outside option (j = 0) we must know the market size, M. Usually
researchers choose the market size based on some information about the number of potential
consumers. In our case, an additional beneﬁt to utilizing a supply-side pricing constraint is that
we can estimate the market size instead of assuming some value for it. We explain how the price
constraint identiﬁes the market size in the next section.
Including α, Σ, ¯ θ, λ, and M, we estimate a total of 39 parameters. Let Θ denote the set of
parameters to be estimated. For a given set of parameters, Θ, we draw ns simulated consumers
based on the above distribution of product valuations, compute the optimal bundle choice for
each simulated consumer, and compute optimal prices. The estimator chooses the parameters
Θ to match the market shares among the simulated consumers to the market shares we observe
in the data, conditional on predicted prices being equal to actual prices.
43In a previous version of this paper, we imputed multi-play purchases among “anonymous” non-subscribers
using the patterns we observe for the identiﬁable non-subscribers (i.e., the same approach utilized in Table 10,
discussed above), and estimated the model via simulated maximum likelihood. The results are very similar to
those we report below.
44In an earlier version of this paper we estimated the demand model via simulated maximum likelihood without
any price-setting conditions. This led to predicted prices that tended to be signiﬁcantly lower than the observed
prices.
45Since capacity constraints are rarely binding in the data, we assume zero marginal costs when solving the
proﬁt-maximization problem.
46In practice we are within 1e − 4 of equality in these conditions.
24More formally, let ˜ sl and sl denote the simulated and observed market shares, respectively, for
purchase option l. Let ˜ p1(Θ) denote the implied optimal single-play price for given parameters
Θ, and let p1 denote the actual single-play price. Similarly, let ˜ p8(Θ) and p8 denote the implied
and actual full season subscription prices. Deﬁne ˜ p and p as the stacked vectors of predicted and
observed prices. We construct moment conditions of the form ml(Θ) = ˜ sl(Θ)− sl, and select Θ
to minimize m0Wm subject to the constraint ˜ p = p, where m is the stacked vector of moment
conditions, and W is a weighting matrix.
4.3 Identiﬁcation
What variation in the data serves to identify each parameter of the demand model? The vari-
ance terms, Σ(k,k), are identiﬁed by the plays’ relative overall market shares: relatively high
share plays must have relatively higher variances. Note, however, that the observed ranking of
market shares need not be a one-to-one mapping with the estimated play variances, because the
covariance terms in Σ also have an impact on choice probabilities. For example, a given play
can have a high market share either because the variance in valuations is high, or because it has
a strong positive correlation with another high-variance play.
The covariance terms themselves are identiﬁed by the bundle combinations chosen by multi-
play buyers, such as the pick-5 subscribers. Pairs of plays that consumers choose to bundle
relatively often will have more positive covariances. We might expect the estimated covariances
to be similar to the empirical covariance matrix shown in Table 11. However, the estimated
covariances are based on a model in which we control for play qualities and prices, and we
utilize the complete dataset.47 Hence, we only expect some degree of similarity. Note also, while
a large fraction of consumers choose to subscribe to the full season of all 8 plays, this does not
necessarily imply strong positive covariances, because other features of the model can explain
this particular behavior, as we explain below.
The degree of price sensitivity, α, is identiﬁed by variation in per-play prices across bundles.
Because TheatreWorks’ pricing involves discounts for larger bundles, consumers’ sensitivity to
price explains why market shares for larger bundles are higher than would otherwise be the case.
An additional source of pricing variation comes from the fact that one speciﬁc 3-play bundle
is oﬀered at a discount ($36.20 per play) while all other 3-play combinations have no discount
($40.80 per play). The taste distribution alone may explain why a speciﬁc 3-play bundle is more
47For example, the relatively large number of full season subscribers will encourage more positive covariances
in the demand estimation.
25popular than other 3-play bundles. Hence, α is identiﬁed by the extent to which demand for the
discounted 3-play bundle exceeds the demand implied by the taste distribution alone. We also
assume there are no complementarities in demand between these particular plays, which seems
reasonable in this context. Imposing the supply-side pricing condition also helps to assure a
reasonable estimate of price sensitivity.
A standard concern with demand estimation is the possibility that observed prices are cor-
related with unobserved demand shifters, which may bias parameter estimates. However, in the
estimation we integrate over all unobserved demand components. There is no remaining error
term that may be correlated with observed prices. Consider, for example, the discounted 3-play
bundle. We estimate the variances and covariances of the taste distribution—i.e., we control for
the qualities of these plays, and we control for the tendency of consumers to want to bundle these
particular plays together. The fact that this speciﬁc bundle is oﬀered at a discount is exogenous
variation for our purposes. Stated diﬀerently, we assume there are there are no bundle-speciﬁc
error terms. And even if there were, endogeneity is only a concern if bundle-speciﬁc errors vary
systematically by bundle size, because TheatreWorks’ prices are in any case only dependent on
the total number of plays (with the exception of one particular three-play bundle).
How do the data identify ¯ θ and λ? This aspect of the model is important for explaining a key
feature of the data. Suppose that ¯ θ = 0 (or equivalently, λ = 0). In this case, the relationship
between bundle size and market share depends on the degree of correlation in tastes for plays, but
in a very particular way. If play valuations are weakly or negatively correlated, the probability
of a consumer having high valuations for all 8 plays is less than the probability of having high
valuations for any 5 plays, say. Hence, controlling for the eﬀect of price, the number of 8-play
subscribers would be less than the number of 5-play subscribers. Similarly, the number of 5-
play subscribers would be less than the number of four-play subscribers, and so forth. On the
other hand, the higher the degree of (positive) correlation, the more often we ought to observe
purchases of larger bundles. But in Table 10 we see that purchases by bundle size are heavily
skewed toward both individual purchases as well as purchases of all eight plays. This pattern
cannot be explained by a simple joint-normal distribution, because the two most commonly
purchased bundle sizes convey conﬂicting information about the correlation in play valuations.
This is why we distinguish theater-lovers in the demand model (i.e. the reason for including λ
and ¯ θ).
Clearly, the relatively high fraction of 5-play and 8-play subscribers serves to identify ¯ θ and
λ. But how are these parameters separately identiﬁed? Since the number of single-play and
8-play buyers are both greater than the number of 2, 3, 4 or 5-play buyers, λ must not be too
26large or too small. If λ is near to one, nearly everyone is a theater-lover, and the model would
predict a low level of single-play sales. If λ is near to zero, we have the same problem described
in the previous paragraph. This logic implies that λ is identiﬁed by the ratio of subscribers (i.e.,
5-play and 8-play buyers) to non-subscribers (i.e., buyers of fewer than 5 plays).
Applying similar logic, if ¯ θ is very large then all theater-lovers will choose the 8-play bundle. If
¯ θ is near zero then we have the same problem described above: we cannot explain the bimodality
of market shares in the data. Therefore, the role of ¯ θ is to deliver an accurate prediction of the
ratio of 5-play subscribers to 8-play subscribers. Hence, λ and ¯ θ are identiﬁed by separate
features of the data.
The supply-side price constraints provide identiﬁcation of the market size, M. To see why,
consider estimation of the demand model without price constraints. In this case we would simply
assume a market size, estimate all other parameters using demand-side information only. While
this approach can deliver a good ﬁt of the observed market shares, there is no assurance that
the optimal prices for the estimated demand model will be equal to the observed prices. In fact,
if we set the market size to 100,000 and estimate using demand-side moments only, we compute
predicted optimal prices that are signiﬁcantly less than the observed prices. This suggests α is
over-estimated—consumers are too sensitive to price.
By reducing the stipulated market size, the actual market share of inside goods increases.
This implies the estimate for α must decrease in order to predict higher probabilities of pur-
chase.48 Importantly, optimal prices depend on α but not M. Hence, lowering M leads to a
lower estimate of α, which in turn leads to higher predicted optimal prices. We can therefore
estimate M by incorporating an optimal pricing constraint in the estimation. This is why the
supply-side pricing constraints provide identiﬁcation of the market size, and allow us to ﬁt the
demand moments while generating reasonable predicted prices.
A ﬁnal comment on the ﬂexibility of the model. Notice from the last two columns of Table 9
that the rank-ordering of play popularity is diﬀerent for non-subscribers (mainly single-play
buyers) than it is for subscribers (which is driven by the tastes of pick-5 buyers because full
season buyers attend all plays). Our speciﬁcation can explain this diﬀerence in the following
way. The variance terms, Σ(k,k), explain the relative popularity of plays among the single-
ticket buyers. The covariance terms in Σ explain the popularity of certain pairings by the pick-5
buyers, which also helps to explain diﬀerences in the popularity of plays that are contrary to
48This reasoning suggests α and M are not separately identiﬁed from demand-side moments alone. From a
practical standpoint this is right, since rich variation in the data is needed for separate identiﬁcation. Formally,
however, α and M are separately identiﬁed from demand moments, based on functional form.
27the rankings of the single-ticket buyers. In other words, allowing for covariance in tastes gives
us the ﬂexibility to explain diﬀerences in play shares between single-play buyers and multi-play
buyers.
4.4 Results
The parameter estimates for the structural demand model are presented in Table 12a. (Standard
errors for the variance-covariance matrix are reported in Table 12b.) Estimates of the variance
coeﬃcients from the distribution of  vary from 1.00 to 3.18. The estimates for the covariances of
 vary from 0.78 to 1.91. It is important to note that Σ is the covariance matrix of . That is to
say, Σ captures the correlation structure conditional on being a theater-lover, or conditional on
not being a theater-lover. However, the correlation structure of the unconditional distribution
of play valuations, V , also depends on the probability of being a theater-lover and the increment
in utility for these consumers. Intuitively, taste correlations should be even more positive than
for the unconditional distribution, because theater-lovers have a positive shift in the valuations
of all plays.
When we compute pairwise correlation coeﬃcients for the unconditional distribution of play
valuations, we ﬁnd that all correlations lie between .60 and .97 (the mean correlation coeﬃcient
is .81). This is important because positive correlation in the demand system tends to reduce the
proﬁtability of bundling-type strategies relative to component pricing. We return to this issue
in the next subsection on counterfactual pricing experiments.
The estimate for consumers’ sensitivity to price (α) is 4.60. To compute the implied price
elasticity of aggregate demand, we increase the price of all possible bundles of tickets by 1% and
measure the change in total tickets sold to all plays. The resulting price elasticity of aggregate
demand is 1.11. Interestingly, when we implement this calculation the demand for certain
mid-sized bundles actually increases, despite increasing price for those bundles. Intuitively, a
1% increase in all prices causes some consumers to substitute away from large to smaller-sized
bundles. For example, demand for the Lucie Stern combination of 3 plays increases by 43% in
response to a 1% increase in all prices.
The estimated probability of an individual being a theater-lover is .077, and the estimated
market size is 37,435. We estimate that theater-lovers’ utility for any single play is higher than
for regular consumers by an amount equal to 2.05 times the standard deviation of the conditional
valuation of play 1 (A Little Night Music), which is normalized to 1. The large magnitude of the
28increment to utility for theater-lovers suggests that large-sized bundles are disproportionately
purchased by theater-lovers. Indeed, this is true. Our estimated demand model predicts that
63% of non-theater-lovers choose the outside option, while the predicted proportions choosing
1, 2, 3, or 4 individual goods are 12%, 4.3%, 1.7%, and 0.17%. Among this same group of
consumers, the predicted market shares for the Lucie Stern, pick-5, and all-8 combinations are
0.75%, 8.6%, and 9.5%. For theater-lovers, on the other hand, only 8% choose the outside good,
while 13% choose a bundle of 5 (accounting for 11% of pick-5 purchases), and 68% subscribe to
all 8 plays (accounting for 37% of all-8 purchases).
The non-monotonicity of predicted market shares with respect to bundle size, even among the
set of non-theater-lovers, is consistent with the high degree of correlation in the estimated dis-
tribution of tastes for individual plays (both unconditionally as well as conditionally on theater-
lover status): consumers tend to either like most of the plays, or none at all. However, the
model requires the presence of theater-lovers to explain why the observed market shares decline
relatively gradually with respect to size in the lower range of bundle size, while rising abruptly
for the largest bundles.
To evaluate the ﬁt of the estimated model, we compare various measures of actual and
predicted market shares. We ﬁnd a reasonably close ﬁt between the actual and predicted overall
market shares for diﬀerent bundle sizes, where we compute the actual shares using the estimated
market size as the denominator. The actual fraction that choose to be pick-5 subscribers is 7.5%,
and we predict 8.9%. The actual fraction all-8 subscribers is 13.7%, and we predict 14.0%.
In Table 13 we present actual and predicted shares of sales for each play. In the top portion
of the table we show the play shares for all consumers (ignoring the outside option). Even
though the predicted shares vary across plays from 19.5% to 29.3%, the actual and predicted
shares are all within 1.5 percentage points, except for the ﬁrst play. The ﬁt is more uneven
when we condition the play shares on how they are bundled. The predicted conditional shares
nevertheless capture a key feature of the data: market shares are quite skewed for unbundled
sales, while being much more symmetric for the pick-5 subscribers.49 For example, the most
popular show among single-play purchases is play (4) with an observed share of 37.7%, more
than four times that of play (2) which is the least popular show among single-play buyers.
By contrast, among pick-5 sales, the most popular show, play (8)—with a share of 14.6%—is
purchased only slightly more often than the least popular show, play (3)—at 10.3%.
The estimated variances and covariances play a critical role here. Note, for example, that
49By construction, the play shares must be identical when conditioned on being bundled as part of the all-8
package.
29the market share for play (4) among unbundled sales is high relative to its popularity among
pick-5 sales. The model explains this fact in part by estimating a large variance for play (4) in
conjunction with relatively low correlations with all the other plays: the high variance together
with low correlations imply that play (8) will have high demand individually, but will tend not
to be purchased together with other plays.
4.5 Analysis of Alternative Pricing Strategies
In this subsection we compare the proﬁtability of the various pricing schemes in the context of
our estimated demand model. We also examine how particular changes in the model aﬀect the
relative proﬁts of these diﬀerent pricing structures.
Counterfactual Pricing Analysis
Using the estimated demand model, we compute proﬁts and consumer surplus under each
of UP, PB, CP, BSP and MB. We also compute the proﬁt associated with the pricing scheme
actually implemented by TheatreWorks, referred to as TW. Under TW the ﬁrm sets a uniform
price for each play, a discount for one particular 3-play bundle, a discount for choosing any 5
plays (pick-5), and a discount for the bundle of all 8 plays. In our baseline model we assume zero
marginal costs and no capacity constraints, which seems reasonable given how few performances
sold out. Below, we examine how capacity constraints would aﬀect the relative proﬁts of the
diﬀerent pricing strategies.
Recall that in the estimation we impose a supply-side pricing constraint based on two of
the four prices under the TW scheme: i.e. the single-play price and the price for all 8 plays.
In estimation these two predicted optimal prices exactly match the observed prices (to within
1e-4). However, in the TW counterfactual we jointly optimize all four prices. Hence, we expect
the TW counterfactual prices to be close to the actual prices, but not necessarily equal.
Table 14 summarizes the results. The interpretation of the prices (p1,...,p8) varies across
regimes, as explained in the note to the table. The revenue and consumer surplus (CS) results
are normalized by the market size (i.e. ﬁgures are per consumer). Proﬁts from the diﬀerent
pricing schemes vary from 63.67 under PB to 69.50 under MB (a diﬀerence of 9.2%). In this
case the variability in proﬁts across price structures is somewhat low compared to many of the
simulations in Section 3. Nevertheless, it is clear that the choice of price structure can be an
important decision.
30It is interesting that PB is the least proﬁtable of the pricing strategies we examine. Bakos
and Brynjolfsson (1999) and Fang and Norman (2006) show that PB becomes more proﬁtable
(relative to CP) as the number of goods increases (with zero marginal cost). But in this example
with 8 goods, PB performs quite badly. Even UP is more proﬁtable than PB in this setting
(by 5%). This reinforces the point that PB is not necessarily a good option for ﬁrms.
Focusing on BSP in Table 14, we ﬁnd that: (i) BSP attains 0.9% higher proﬁt than CP, and
(ii) BSP attains 98.5% of the proﬁt from MB. These results are striking for a couple of reasons.
MB requires the ﬁrm to set 255 distinct prices in this example, while BSP involves only 8 prices.
It is also important to note that our empirical example happened to yield an estimated demand
system that is somewhat unfavorable to bundling-like strategies. We ﬁnd a very high degree of
positive correlation in valuations—all correlations lie between .60 and .97. The fact that BSP is
more proﬁtable than CP in this setting is interesting, even if the diﬀerences are not economically
large.
Under BSP the price per play varies from $56.41 (for one play) to $32.89 (for all 8 plays)—a
discount of 42% on the single play price for full season subscribers. Note also that under BSP the
price for seeing a single play ($56.41) is greater than the maximum price for any play under CP
($44.08). As explained in the previous section, BSP encourages consumers to purchase multiple
plays by a combination of raising the price for one play and lowering prices for multiple-plays.
Under CP there are 9.9% of consumers that attend exactly one play, while under BSP only 2.6%
of consumers attend just one play. Under CP there are 9.0% of consumers that attend all 8
plays, while under BSP 12.6% do so.
It is interesting to compare the performance of CP and BSP in relation to the highest-demand
play. One tends to expect that CP will generate more proﬁt from these kinds of products than
would BSP, although we have argued and demonstrated that BSP is also eﬀective at extracting
surplus in the presence of asymmetric demand. The play with the highest demand is play four—
under UP play four has the highest level of sales, and under CP play four has the highest optimal
price. For CP we compute that 25.2% of consumers attend play four, and by construction every
ticket is sold at the price $44.08. Under BSP we ﬁnd that 27.1% consumers attend play four.
The average (per play) price paid by consumers that attend play four under BSP is $36.70. It
follows that BSP obtains 21% less revenue from play four than does CP.50 Since BSP attains
higher overall revenue, it must be that BSP extracts more surplus than CP for the lower demand
plays. For example, we ﬁnd that BSP yields 7% more revenue for play one (the lowest-demand
50Revenue is synonymous with variable proﬁt in this context, because the marginal cost of each ticket is zero.
Since we have no information on ﬁxed costs we do not refer to these numbers of proﬁts.
31good) than CP.
The fact that CP generates more revenue than BSP for the popular good is not a general
result. For other parameterizations of demand we may ﬁnd the reverse. It is interesting to
note that under BSP there is price dispersion among the consumers that attend play four (or
any other particular play), and the amount of surplus that the ﬁrm extracts from consumers
of popular plays depends on whether these consumers pay higher or lower prices, on average.
In our simulation, under BSP 46% of consumer that attend play four did so as part of the
full-season subscription, for whom the per-play ticket price is $32.89. At the other extreme,
for 8% of the attendees of play four this was the only play they attended, and hence the ticket
price for them is $56.41. And there are six other price points in between, depending upon how
many other plays the consumer purchased tickets for. The distribution of ticket prices paid by
attendees is diﬀerent for each play under BSP. For example, under BSP nobody buys a ticket
to play one by itself, and hence the highest price paid by any individual attending play one is
$46.92 (i.e. per-play price for a two-good bundle).
The within-play price variation that arises under BSP is a consequence of people self-selecting
diﬀerent size bundles. Sorting occurs along the dimension of the total number of plays. That
is, consumers with a high aggregate valuation for multiple plays tend to purchase larger-sized
bundles and pay a higher total price. But this sorting under BSP does not necessarily imply that
in a given play, consumers with a high valuation for that play will pay a high price for attending
that play. Consider the consumers that attend play four under BSP: the correlation between
consumers’ valuations of play four and each consumers’ per-play price is -0.12. Intuitively, this
is due to the high degree of positive correlation in the estimated demand system—consumers
that like play four also tend to like many other plays, and therefore tend to obtain discounts for
buying larger bundle sizes. For the same reasoning, if demand system exhibited a high degree of
negative correlation, we would expect the within-play correlation between price and valuations
to be positive. It follows that the less positive correlation there is in the demand system, the
more surplus BSP extracts from higher-demand goods, relative to CP.
As expected, we predict optimal prices under TW that are very close the actual prices set
by TheatreWorks.51 The predicted single-play price under the TW scheme is slightly higher
than the observed price set by TheatreWorks, and the predicted full-season subscription price is
slightly lower than the actual price. Our estimated model indicates more aggressive discounting
than TheatreWorks’ actual price schedule, but not by much. The TW price structure appears
51To understand why optimal prices are not exactly equal to actual prices, recall that in the estimation, we
only impose the optimality of the individual-play and all-8 prices, rather than the full set of prices.
32to perform quite well in the counterfactuals. As shown in the table, the proﬁt under TW is
marginally less than for CP, despite the fact that TW involves half the number of prices as CP.
This reinforces the value of bundling-like strategies, since TW incorporates a degree of bundling
into its structure.
Model Perturbations
Given our estimates of demand, it is clear that BSP is the superior pricing strategy among
the simple alternatives we consider. To evaluate the robustness of this conclusion, we ask how
we would have to change the demand system to reverse the conclusion.
We have emphasized throughout this study that BSP is able to perform well even in the
presence of highly asymmetric demand. As a measure of asymmetry, in the baseline model
above, the highest price for a play under CP ($44) is almost 60% greater than the lowest price
($28). But what if we ampliﬁed this diﬀerence? How much would we have to exacerbate the
diﬀerences in plays’ qualities to make CP more proﬁtable than BSP? To examine this question,
we took min-preserving spreads of the estimated variances (holding all other parameters ﬁxed),
and recomputed the optimal prices and proﬁts under the various pricing strategies.52 We ﬁnd
that BSP remains more proﬁtable than CP even when the highest price for a play under CP
($95) is 340% greater than the lowest price play ($28). However, if the price diﬀerence increases
to over 385% (price range of $28 to $108) then CP attains higher proﬁt than BSP. Hence,
increasing demand asymmetry favors CP, but it takes a remarkably high degree of asymmetry
for CP to be more proﬁtable than BSP.
As explained above in the context of the numerical experiments, positive marginal costs
should typically favor CP over BSP. If we recompute optimal prices based on the estimated
demand model, assuming positive marginal costs, we can indeed get CP to be more proﬁtable
than BSP. However, the required level of marginal cost is extremely high: only when we set
marginal cost as high as $40 does CP become more proﬁtable than BSP. We suspect this is due
to the high degree of positive correlation in consumers’ tastes, for the following reason. Positive
marginal costs tend to be bad for bundling strategies because consumers who purchase bundles
may end up consuming products they value below cost, shrinking the extractable surplus from
bundles. But when valuations are highly positively correlated, such violations of the “exclusion”
condition will be relatively rare. It would be interesting to explore the combined eﬀects of
52That is, we hold the variance of the lowest-variance play at the estimated value, min[ˆ Σ(k,k)], and increase
the remaining variance terms such that they diﬀer from min[ˆ Σ(k,k)] by ∆ times the corresponding diﬀerences in
the actual estimates. At the same time, we inﬂate the covariances such that the correlations remain the same as
in the actual estimates.
33marginal costs and correlations in tastes in more detail, but for the present purposes we simply
note that BSP’s superiority over CP is remarkably robust to increases in marginal cost.
Capacity constraints, which we have so far assumed away, could also favor CP over BSP. To
assess the impact of capacity constraints, we assume capacity is equal for all plays, and is set to
∆% of the predicted sales for the most popular play under UP (where UP is computed under the
assumption there are no capacity constraints). How small must ∆ be (i.e., how tight does the
capacity constraint have to be) for CP to be more proﬁtable than BSP? We ﬁnd that if ∆ = 90,
BSP is still more proﬁtable than CP, but if we lower it to 80 then CP becomes more proﬁtable
than BSP. Hence, it appears the greater is excess demand (i.e. the lower is capacity relative to
demand) the more likely that CP is more proﬁtable than BSP. Regardless, for TheatreWorks
(as well as many other ﬁrms) the capacity for each good is to some extent endogenous. This
makes it less likely that capacity constraints are a reason to prefer CP over BSP when capacity
is a choice variable for ﬁrms.53
While it is true that we can make CP more proﬁtable than BSP by signiﬁcantly amplifying
demand asymmetries or by imposing relatively tight capacity constraints, note that our esti-
mated demand model exhibits a high degree of positive correlation in tastes. To highlight the
degree to which positive correlation is disadvantageous to BSP, we re-compute optimal prices
with all the estimated covariances set to zero, holding ﬁxed all other estimated parameters. In
this case, BSP is a dramatic 20.5% more proﬁtable than CP.
Finally, we argued in Section 3 that the inclusion of diminishing marginal utility may reduce
the proﬁt from CP by even more than it does for BSP. To verify this claim we generalize the








j − αpj : j = {1,...,J}
0 : j = J
where nj equals the number of goods in bundle j and γ is a parameter. We set γ = −.2 to
capture diminishing marginal utility, and compute optimal prices holding all other parameters
ﬁxed at the estimated values under the baseline model.54 Unsurprisingly the proﬁts under all
pricing schemes are lowered relative to the baseline. But now BSP attains 8.8% higher proﬁt
than CP, compared to 0.9% in the baseline model. Hence, the inclusion of diminishing marginal
utility can increase the proﬁts of BSP relative to CP.
As we found in the numerical experiments discussed in Section 3, the above perturbations to
53In fact TheatreWorks oﬀers more performances for some shows than for others, suggesting they choose ca-
pacities for each play (see Table 9).
54Implicitly, γ = 0 in the baseline model.
34the estimated demand model demonstrate that in some cases BSP is more proﬁtable than CP,
and in other cases the reverse is true. What is striking about the perturbations we analyze here
is that it requires rather dramatic changes to the estimated model for CP to out-perform BSP.
That is to say, the relative proﬁtability of BSP seems very robust in our analysis.
5 Conclusion
We have examined the proﬁtability of several incomplex pricing strategies for multiproduct
ﬁrms, relative to the impractical ideal of mixed bundling. Rather than focus on a simpliﬁed
and unrealistic model of demand, we have relied on computational methods to explore these
issues in a wide variety of demand and cost scenarios. The analysis yields two main ﬁndings.
First, bundle-size pricing tends to attain nearly the same level of proﬁts as mixed bundling
in a broad range of demand and cost scenarios. Hence, mixed bundling involves considerable
redundancy—it includes many prices that are of negligible importance to proﬁtability. Second,
bundle-size pricing tends to be more proﬁtable than component pricing, even in circumstances
with a high degree of demand asymmetry across products.
To illustrate the empirical relevance of our ﬁndings we estimate the demand facing a theater
company that produces a season of 8 plays, and compute the proﬁtability of each pricing scheme
in this case. We ﬁnd that bundle-size pricing is 0.9% more proﬁtable than component pricing,
and bundle-size pricing attains 98.5% of the mixed bundling proﬁts. Since the estimated demand
model exhibits a very high degree of positive correlation, these results may understate the gains
from BSP in other settings. Arguably, a limitation of our empirical analysis is that it concerns
a fairly narrow setting. However, we see the simplicity of our example as a virtue: “bigger”
examples invariably involve additional complexities (such as active resale markets, a much larger
number of products, etc.) that make a clean empirical analysis infeasible.
Our results represent a signiﬁcant push towards understanding the merits of feasible pricing
schemes for multiproduct ﬁrms. What insight does the prior literature on bundling have for
a ﬁrm with 5 products, say? A narrow reading of the literature would imply the ﬁrm should
implement mixed bundling with 31 prices, which is unlikely to be practical for most ﬁrms. A
broader interpretation of the literature would suggest the ﬁrm should consider some form of
bundling—which is a powerful insight—but it is unclear exactly what form that should be. This
paper suggests speciﬁc advice to such a ﬁrm; bundle-size pricing (5 prices) tends to attain about
99% of the mixed bundling proﬁt, and is almost certainly more proﬁtable than either component
35pricing or pure bundling.
An important theme of our ﬁndings is that bundling-like pricing schemes are often more
proﬁtable than component pricing. This is interesting because economists are prone to criticize
ﬁrms for the lack of component pricing (e.g. movie cinemas). In fact, the appeal of bundling over
component pricing is reﬂected in the pricing of some notable multiproduct ﬁrms. Major league
baseball teams, for example, tend to employ bundling strategies (such as discounts for purchasing
any 9 games) more often than they employ component pricing strategies (such as charging prices
that vary by opponent or by day of the week).55 Also, online music sellers almost never charge
diﬀerent prices for diﬀerent music tracks, even though demand is dramatically stronger for some
songs than others. But music is sold via subscriptions (a strategy akin to pure bundling) by
at least two of the major online music stores. And while television service providers typically
do not charge diﬀerent prices for diﬀerent channels, some oﬀer discounts that depend on the
number of channels selected.56
More generally, our results suggest an additional explanation for the observed simplicity of
multiproduct ﬁrms’ pricing strategies. Other authors have proposed various theories to explain
why, in practice, complex pricing schemes are costly to implement.57 Our study is the ﬁrst (to
our knowledge) to quantify the beneﬁts of complexity. Our ﬁndings suggest these beneﬁts are
generally small, so that the costs of complexity need not be large to make simplicity the best
policy.
55We examined the pricing for all 30 major league teams during the 2006 season. 16 teams employed some form
of bundling (not including season-ticket subscriptions), whereas only 7 charged prices that varied by opponent or
by day of the week.
56See British Sky Broadcasting for a clear example: www.sky.com/portal/site/skycom/products/packages.
57See, for example, Blinder, Canetti, Lebow and Rudd (1998) and Kahneman, Knetsch and Thaler (1986).
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38Appendix A
We noted in the text that BSP may be more proﬁtable than PB if (i) willingness to pay for the
bundle of all K products is heterogeneous across consumers, and (ii) consumers (or consumer
types) who have the highest willingness to pay for a bundle of size m are not necessarily the
same as those with the highest willingness to pay for a bundle of size n > m.
We can establish a more formal condition by using an approach similar to McAfee et al.
They note that MB nests CP as a special case, and derive a condition on the joint distribution
of tastes such that a local deviation from the CP prices yields an increase in proﬁts. In our case,
we know that BSP nests PB as a special case, and we can ask when a local deviation from the
PB price will be proﬁtable.
Since BSP allows consumers to pick their own bundles, any purchased bundle of m products
will consist of the m products for which the consumer’s valuations were highest. Let rim denote
consumer i’s mth-highest valuation (i.e., the mth order statistic). Then consumer i’s willingness
to pay for a bundle of size m is just yim =
Pm
k=1 rik; i.e., the sum of the ﬁrst m order statistics.
Using this notation, we can write a suﬃcient condition for BSP to yield higher expected proﬁts
than PB in terms of the joint distribution of yi,K−1 and riK:
Proposition: Suppose a ﬁrm sells K products for which marginal costs are identical and
equal to c, and let g denote the joint distribution of yi,K−1 (a consumer’s willingness to pay for
a bundle of any K −1 products) and riK (the willingness to pay for the least preferred product).
If p∗ is the optimal PB price, then BSP is more proﬁtable than PB if there exists a ∆ such that







To prove this, consider starting with BSP prices equal to the optimal PB price, p1 = p2 =
... = pK = p∗, and then reducing the price of bundles with K − 1 or fewer products to
˜ pK−1 = p∗ − ∆. The expected proﬁts under these prices are












39The diﬀerence from the PB proﬁts is then











Conditions (i) and (ii) of the proposition simply guarantee that this diﬀerence is positive.
Note that when marginal cost is zero, condition (i) will not be met. However, this does
not mean BSP cannot be more proﬁtable than PB when marginal cost is zero: the proposition
establishes a suﬃcient but not necessary condition for BSP proﬁts to be higher than PB proﬁts.
So even if this kind of local change is not proﬁtable, there may still be other (nonlocal) changes
that are. However, the proposition does suggest that positive marginal costs make it more likely
that BSP beats PB.
40Appendix B
In this appendix we simply report the optimal prices and proﬁts for the two-good model de-
scribed in section 3.2. Consumers’ valuations for the two goods are independent uniform random
variables on [0,1] and [0,θ], respectively. (Assume θ ≥ 1.) Marginal cost is 0.
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41Appendix C
Available on request from the authors (or via our home pages on the web). It’s very long.
42Table 1. Alternative pricing strategies
Initials Name Num. prices Description
UP Uniform pricing 1 Each product sold separately at a uni-
form price
PB Pure bundling 1 Only option for consumers is the full
bundle
CP Component pricing K Each product sold separately at dif-
ferent prices
BSP Bundle-size pricing K Prices depend only on number of pur-
chased products
MB Mixed bundling 2K − 1 Separate prices for every possible
combination of products
43Table 2. Alternative taste distributions
Name Description
Exponential vik’s are independent exponential random variables with means between 0.2
and 2.0
Logit vik’s are independent extreme value random variables with means between
0 and 2.5, and scale parameter = 0.25
Lognormal vik’s are independent lognormal random variables; log(vik) has variance 0.25
and mean between -1.5 and 1
Lognormal(-) log(vi) is a multivariate normal random vector with means ranging between
-1.5 and 1, and negative pairwise correlations between products∗
Lognormal(+) log(vi) is a multivariate normal random vector with means ranging between
-1.5 and 1, and positive pairwise correlations between products
Normal vik’s are independent normal random variables with variances equal to 0.25,
and means between -1 and 2.5
Normal(-) vi is a multivariate normal random vector with means ranging between -1
and 2.5, and negative pairwise correlations between products∗
Normal(+) vi is a multivariate normal random vector with means ranging between -1
and 2.5, and positive pairwise correlations between products
Normal(+/-) vi is a multivariate normal random vector with means ranging between -1
and 2.5, and pairwise correlations are a mix of positive and negative values∗∗
Normal(v) vik’s are independent normal random variables with means equal to zero,
and variances between 0.25 and 1.75
Normal(v-) vi is a multivariate normal random vector with means equal to zero, variances
between 0.25 and 1.75, and negative pairwise correlations between products∗
Normal(v+) vi is a multivariate normal random vector with means equal to zero, variances
between 0.25 and 1.75, and positive pairwise correlations between products
Uniform vik’s are independent uniform random variables on [0,ak], with ak between
0.4 and 4
∗ For distributions with negatively correlated tastes, we set the pairwise correlation coeﬃcients all equal to r/2,
where r is the smallest (i.e., most negative) value such that the covariance matrix remains positive deﬁnite. For
K=(2, 3, 4, 5) the correlation coeﬃcients are (-0.5, -0.25, -0.1667, -0.125) respectively.
∗∗ For K > 2, we assume tastes for one pair of products have a correlation of -.25 and for another pair of products
0.25.
44Table 3. Percentiles of proﬁts (as a fraction of BSP proﬁts) with zero marginal costs
Pricing Scheme
Taste Distn. percentile UP CP PB MB
.01 0.632 0.724 0.995 1.000
Exponential .50 0.752 0.812 1.000 1.001
.99 0.878 0.977 1.000 1.041
.01 0.532 0.838 0.956 1.000
Logit .50 0.779 0.899 0.989 1.003
.99 0.956 0.984 1.000 1.019
.01 0.403 0.734 0.999 1.000
Lognormal .50 0.698 0.809 1.000 1.000
.99 0.861 0.945 1.000 1.002
.01 0.623 0.806 0.972 1.000
Normal .50 0.831 0.900 0.995 1.001
.99 0.985 1.023 1.000 1.043
.01 0.690 0.930 0.901 1.000
Normal(+) .50 0.900 0.962 0.978 1.000
.99 0.992 1.024 1.000 1.081
.01 0.454 0.544 0.937 1.000
Normal(-) .50 0.671 0.743 1.000 1.000
.99 0.991 1.025 1.000 1.090
.01 0.837 0.872 0.951 1.000
Normal(v) .50 0.895 0.936 0.973 1.022
.99 0.961 1.039 0.997 1.097
.01 0.419 0.800 0.982 1.000
Uniform .50 0.777 0.884 0.998 1.022
.99 0.919 1.003 1.000 1.072
The table reports percentiles of the ratio of proﬁts to BSP proﬁts, calculated across roughly 900 experiments
represented in each cell. For a detailed summary of the price strategies and the taste distributions see Tables 1
and 2, respectively.
45Table 4. Percentiles of proﬁts (as a fraction of BSP proﬁts) with equal positive marginal costs
Pricing Scheme
Taste Distn. percentile UP CP PB MB
.01 0.720 0.758 0.788 1.000
Exponential .50 0.812 0.859 0.975 1.004
.99 0.946 1.001 0.994 1.048
.01 0.552 0.840 0.434 1.000
Logit .50 0.801 0.906 0.958 1.003
.99 0.991 0.998 0.995 1.019
.01 0.563 0.728 0.841 1.000
Lognormal .50 0.743 0.828 0.995 1.000
.99 0.935 0.971 1.000 1.004
.01 0.632 0.809 0.344 1.000
Normal .50 0.851 0.907 0.929 1.001
.99 1.000 1.001 1.000 1.011
.01 0.700 0.932 0.417 1.000
Normal(+) .50 0.915 0.966 0.898 1.000
.99 0.999 1.000 0.999 1.009
.01 0.461 0.539 0.323 1.000
Normal(-) .50 0.700 0.768 0.969 1.000
.99 1.000 1.020 1.000 1.021
.01 0.864 0.892 0.676 1.000
Normal(v) .50 0.912 0.956 0.804 1.022
.99 0.970 1.056 0.902 1.101
.01 0.592 0.820 0.746 1.000
Uniform .50 0.823 0.924 0.969 1.031
.99 0.960 1.032 0.993 1.086
The table reports percentiles of the ratio of proﬁts to BSP proﬁts, calculated across the roughly 900 experiments
represented in each cell. For a detailed summary of the price strategies and the taste distributions see Tables 1
and 2, respectively. Marginal cost is set to 0.2 for all products.
46Table 5. Percentiles of proﬁts (as a fraction of BSP proﬁts) with unequal marginal costs
Pricing Scheme
Taste Distn. percentile UP CP PB MB
.01 0.657 0.824 0.812 1.000
Exponential .50 0.839 0.940 0.910 1.054
.99 0.939 1.058 0.988 1.172
.01 0.373 0.834 0.829 1.000
Logit .50 0.713 0.903 0.950 1.014
.99 0.949 0.992 0.989 1.070
.01 0.438 0.774 0.957 1.000
Lognormal .50 0.720 0.888 0.989 1.034
.99 0.911 0.993 0.997 1.081
.01 0.466 0.799 0.798 1.000
Normal .50 0.792 0.910 0.951 1.009
.99 0.981 1.097 1.000 1.143
.01 0.000 0.931 0.809 1.000
Normal(+) .50 0.841 0.967 0.932 1.003
.99 0.988 1.035 1.000 1.160
.01 0.303 0.523 0.838 1.000
Normal(-) .50 0.632 0.768 0.987 1.007
.99 1.000 1.122 1.000 1.146
.01 0.834 0.894 0.760 1.000
Normal(v) .50 0.908 0.967 0.823 1.032
.99 0.969 1.096 0.933 1.149
.01 0.437 0.864 0.795 1.000
Uniform .50 0.813 0.999 0.893 1.101
.99 0.947 1.091 0.992 1.230
The table reports percentiles of the ratio of proﬁts to BSP proﬁts, calculated across the roughly 900 experiments
represented in each cell. For a detailed summary of the price strategies and the taste distributions see Tables 1
and 2, respectively. Marginal cost equals 0.5 times consumers’ mean product valuation.
47Table 6. Percentiles of proﬁts (as a fraction of BSP proﬁts) with capacity constraints
Pricing Scheme
Taste Distn. percentile UP CP PB MB
.01 0.455 0.818 0.652 1.000
Exponential .50 0.859 0.947 0.857 1.069
.99 1.227 1.246 1.000 1.303
.01 0.436 0.858 0.743 1.000
Logit .50 0.770 0.922 0.986 1.004
.99 1.000 1.025 1.000 1.071
.01 0.351 0.746 0.868 1.000
Lognormal .50 0.700 0.831 1.000 1.000
.99 0.934 0.953 1.000 1.061
.01 0.583 0.821 0.666 1.000
Normal .50 0.833 0.915 0.987 1.000
.99 1.004 1.043 1.000 1.085
.01 0.597 0.907 0.687 1.000
Normal(+) .50 0.876 0.964 0.970 1.000
.99 1.005 1.038 1.000 1.056
.01 0.482 0.667 0.704 1.000
Normal(-) .50 0.774 0.852 0.990 1.010
.99 1.001 1.054 1.000 1.128
.01 0.847 0.919 0.499 1.000
Normal(v) .50 0.912 0.976 0.709 1.027
.99 1.125 1.125 0.949 1.138
.01 0.336 0.858 0.729 1.000
Uniform .50 0.844 0.977 0.914 1.064
.99 1.143 1.198 1.000 1.285
The table reports percentiles of the ratio of proﬁts to BSP proﬁts, calculated across the roughly 900 experiments
represented in each cell. Marginal costs are zero, but there is a binding capacity constraint which varies by
experiment. It is set by ﬁrst computing the optimal uniform price under no capacity constraints, ﬁnding the
quantity demanded for the most popular product, and setting the constraint equal to 0.9 times that quantity.
48Table 7. Price diﬀerences and market shares, by bundle size
K=3
Average price diﬀerences Market shares
Bundle size |pCP − pMB|/pMB |pBSP − pMB|/pMB CP BSP MB
1 0.295 0.657 0.384 0.125 0.140
2 0.146 0.183 0.227 0.170 0.197
3 0.174 0.037 0.082 0.287 0.274
K=4
Average price diﬀerences Market shares
Bundle size |pCP − pMB|/pMB |pBSP − pMB|/pMB CP BSP MB
1 0.359 0.809 0.327 0.089 0.097
2 0.196 0.306 0.250 0.134 0.157
3 0.167 0.123 0.140 0.147 0.169
4 0.202 0.037 0.051 0.257 0.238
K=5
Average price diﬀerences Market shares
Bundle size |pCP − pMB|/pMB |pBSP − pMB|/pMB CP BSP MB
1 0.409 0.929 0.275 0.062 0.067
2 0.238 0.403 0.245 0.106 0.119
3 0.185 0.197 0.170 0.119 0.144
4 0.183 0.094 0.092 0.139 0.154
5 0.218 0.035 0.035 0.232 0.212
Price diﬀerences are calculated as a percent of the MB price, and then averaged across prices within bundle size
and across experiments. Market shares are averages across experiments for bundles of a given size. For example,
on average across experiments with K = 3, MB pricing leads 14.0% of consumers to purchase a single product.
49Table 8. Average welfare eﬀects
CP BSP MB
K = 3 Total output 1.086 1.329 1.359
Consumer surplus 0.590 0.526 0.523
Producer surplus 0.929 1.072 1.089
Total surplus 1.520 1.597 1.611
Dead weight loss 0.367 0.290 0.276
K = 4 Total output 1.452 1.827 1.874
Consumer surplus 0.796 0.692 0.670
Producer surplus 1.261 1.489 1.516
Total surplus 2.057 2.180 2.186
Dead weight loss 0.493 0.370 0.364
K = 5 Total output 1.815 2.347 2.410
Consumer surplus 1.000 0.850 0.808
Producer surplus 1.590 1.913 1.951
Total surplus 2.589 2.763 2.760
Dead weight loss 0.619 0.445 0.448
Total output is calculated as the number of units sold of all K products combined. The cells report averages
taken across experiments.
50Table 9. Summary of ticket sales
Number of Average Ticket sales Ticket sales
Play Type Performances Attendance (subscription) (non-subscription)
A Little Night Music Musical 30 294.87 7018 1828
All My Sons Drama 33 233.85 6826 891
Bat Boy Musical 30 263.93 6782 1136
Memphis Musical 30 352.40 6999 3573
My Antonia Drama 26 312.38 7002 1120
Nickel and Dimed Drama 26 343.62 6800 2134
Proof Drama 25 319.88 6885 1112
The Fourth Wall Comedy 29 313.83 7385 1716
Total 229 302.21 55,697 13,510
Three plays (Bat Boy, All My Sons, and The Fourth Wall) were performed at the Lucie Stern Theater in Palo
Alto (capacity=428). The remaining 5 were performed at the Mountain View Center for the Performing Arts
(capacity=589).
51Table 10. Sales by purchase option
Purchase option Price per play ($) Number of consumers
Non-subscription:
1 play 40.80 8,131
2 plays 40.80 1,409
3 plays 40.80 555
4 plays 40.80 224
Subscription:
3-play bundle 36.20 205
5-play pick 37.00 2,794
8-play bundle 34.55 5,139
For non-subscription purchases, the numbers of consumers in each purchase option are computed by extrapolating
the purchase patterns of the consumers whose identities we could observe to the full sample of non-subscription
purchases. See text for an explanation. The 3-play subscription bundle was for the speciﬁc 3 plays performed at
the (smaller) Lucie Stern Theater in Palo Alto, which is why the per-play price is lower than the 5-play bundle.
Consumers purchasing the 5-play subscription could combine any 5 plays of their choice.
52Table 11. Correlation of tastes for pick-5 subscribers
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
(1) A Little Night Music .000
(2) All My Sons -.026 .000
(3) Bat Boy .067 -.233 .000
(4) Memphis .072 -.081 .257 .000
(5) My Antonia .177 .067 -.086 -.037 .000
(6) Nickel and Dimed -.160 -.009 -.013 -.039 .001 .000
(7) Proof -.066 .210 -.030 -.057 -.094 .008 .000
(8) The Fourth Wall -.038 .034 .003 -.117 -.007 .196 .008 .000
This is the diﬀerence between the observed correlation matrix and the correlation matrix that would be expected
































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































54Table 12b. Standard errors for estimated covariances (Σ) in Table 12a
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
(2) 0.0397 0.0136
(3) 0.0191 0.0395 0.0193
(4) 0.0450 0.0448 0.1028 0.0540
(5) 0.0313 0.0285 0.0385 0.1009 0.0178
(6) 0.0237 0.0318 0.0406 0.0501 0.0514 0.0264
(7) 0.0321 0.0291 0.0349 0.0466 0.0335 0.0629 0.0203
(8) 0.0373 0.0337 0.0452 0.0526 0.0415 0.0410 0.0619 0.0338
55Table 13. Actual and predicted market shares of each play
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Shares among all consumers (%)
Actual 23.6 20.6 21.1 28.2 21.7 23.9 21.4 24.3
Predicted 19.5 20.7 22.5 29.3 21.4 23.9 21.6 25.4
Shares among all unbundled sales (%)
Actual 19.3 9.40 12.0 37.7 11.8 22.5 11.7 18.1
Predicted 5.32 2.78 6.29 37.6 8.83 11.1 10.0 18.1
Shares among pick-5 subscribers (%)
Actual 13.5 10.6 10.3 13.3 13.3 11.9 12.5 14.6
Predicted 9.25 11.8 13.9 12.8 11.4 15.8 11.3 13.7
56Table 14. Counterfactual pricing
UP PB TW CP BSP MB
p1 35.60 44.55 27.79 56.41 48.25
p2 30.07 46.92 43.08
p3 38.01 34.67 41.12 40.57
p4 44.08 37.72 38.68
p5 36.68 31.46 36.80 38.11
p6 38.89 35.04 36.54
p7 33.23 34.01 35.23
p8 30.81 33.30 37.90 32.89 34.29
Revenue 66.85 63.67 67.57 67.81 68.42 69.50
CS 55.03 54.37 54.02 55.88 54.75 52.62
For UP, p1 is the optimal uniform price for a single play. For PB, p8 is the optimal per-play price for the bundle
of all 8 plays. TW is the pricing scheme currently employed by the theater company: p1 is the single-play price,
p3 is the per-play price for a speciﬁc bundle of 3 plays, p5 is the per-play price for any combination of 5 plays, and
p8 is the per-play price if you buy all 8. For CP, p1-p8 are the prices for the 8 individual plays, and for BSP, p1-p8
are the per-play prices for any bundle containing the corresponding number of plays. For MB, p1-p8 are mean
per-play prices for bundles of a given size (e.g. p1 is the mean single-play price, p2 is the mean price for all 2-play
bundles, and so forth). The revenue and consumer surplus numbers are normalized by the market size—i.e., we
report revenue per consumer.



















58Figure 2: Distributions of proﬁts for each pricing strategy, relative to BSP,
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Capacity constraints
Each box-plot depicts the 1st, 25th, 50th, 75th and 99th percentile of the distribution of proﬁt relative to the
proﬁt from MB.
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